Trump’s ridiculous bullying of Canada is backfiring Robert Reich What do bullies do when someone stands up to their bullying and punches them in the face? They look for someone weaker to bully who won’t punch back.

Presumably that’s why Donald Trump has now taken on Canada, after Iran punched back so hard in the cage match the US president began more than six months ago as to leave him humiliated and baffled.

Trump wants to be the bully who humiliates others and forces them into submission. Needing to assert his dominance, Trump has now started a trade war with our northern neighbor, friend, second-largest trading partner (after Mexico) and, at least until now, reliable ally.

He’s hammering Canada on his Truth Social and in media appearances, saying Canada has “ripped off” the US for years, and signing an order to rename Lake Ontario “Lake America”.

This is pure bunk, of course – more empty Trump bravado and ignorant belligerence. Canada? Really? If Mel Brooks were still making movies, this would be a comedy. But as all else with Trump, it’s no laughing matter.


Trump apparently assumed that Canada would quickly surrender because it had more to lose. The tariffs Trump has imposed on Canada – along with those he’s threatening if Canada retaliates – affect a tiny portion of the US’s total imports but a huge portion of Canada’s total exports.

Jamieson Greer, Trump’s US trade representative, says the duties are too small to pose a problem for the US and are “more emergency than ours”.

But bullies like Trump rarely think about the effects of their bullying on the thinking and attitudes of their targets.

Trump’s bullying of Iran has not only reinforced its hardline regime but shown them that control over the strait of Hormuz is an effective means of gaining concessions from other Gulf states as well as the US, and likely strengthened their resolve to build a nuclear weapon.

Trump’s bullying of Canada, meanwhile, is igniting a patriotism that has often eluded that nation, which separatist factions have long threatened to pull apart.

Mark Carney’s decision to stand up to Trump – through “dollar for dollar” retaliation on goods coming from key industries in states including Ohio and Texas with competitive Senate elections – has led to a surge of support for the prime minister’s Liberal party. Liberals won three special by-elections on Monday.

Trump’s trade war with Canada has also dimmed the prospects of Canada’s separatist movements, at least in the short term. A candidate from Carney’s Liberal party edged out a Quebec separatist in one of Monday’s special by-elections, in a district hit hard by US tariffs.

This is a good omen for Canada before 5 October’s vote in Quebec on whether the province’s secessionist party, Parti Québécois, gains additional seats in the province’s legislative body, and 19 October’s vote in Alberta on whether to hold a referendum to secede from the rest of Canada.

Trump may also have underestimated the negative reactions to his trade war at home. According to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll, 57% of Americans ‌oppose Trump’s moves to impose tariffs on Canadian imports. About 63% oppose his peevish order to rename Lake Ontario “Lake America”. Only 20% support the higher tariffs on Canadian goods.

The negative response is especially pronounced in border states whose economies are tightly interconnected with Canada.

In Michigan, for example, where overwhelming majorities oppose Trump’s tariffs on Canada, Democrats have launched new attack ads on the Republican Senate candidate Mike Rogers for refusing to denounce the tariffs. The Democratic Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed called Trump an “asshole” for launching the trade war.

There’s still time for the US and Canada to avoid the worst of the economic and political fallout from this. Carney’s “dollar for dollar” retaliation goes into effect on 8 September but Trump’s counter-counter measure – threatened 50% tariffs on autos and auto parts – won’t go into effect until New Year’s Day.

Still, no one should expect an easy resolution to what may go down in history as the stupidest of all the stupid foreign policies Trump has initiated. And given the extent of Trump’s dumb international moves, that is saying something.

Robert Reich, a former US secretary of labor, is a professor of public policy emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley. He is a Guardian US columnist and his newsletter is at robertreich.substack.com. His new book, Coming Up Short: A Memoir of My America, is out now in the US and in the UK

This article was amended on 2 September 2026. An earlier version said the provincial election in Quebec is on 8 October, but it will be on 5 October.

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SOURCE:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/sep/02/trump-canada-tariffs-trade-war-backfiring

Will the US Flag Fly Again in Kabul? Dure Akram Five years after the last American troops left Afghanistan, the Taliban are asking Washington to come back–not with soldiers, but with diplomats and money. On August 14, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi told The New York Times that the United States could reopen its embassy and invest in mines, dams and roads. “We consider the chapter of war to have come to an end,” he said.

Two weeks later, he sharpened the pitch to the Financial Times, welcoming US investment in mining and infrastructure and putting Afghanistan’s estimated $1 trillion mineral wealth on the table.

Washington, however, is sending almost the opposite signal. The embassy has been closed since August 31, 2021; the Afghanistan Affairs Unit remains in Doha; Afghanistan is still under a Level 4 “Do Not Travel” advisory; and on the fifth anniversary of Abbey Gate, President Donald Trump again described the withdrawal as a disaster and accused the Taliban of freeing thousands of prisoners from Bagram. Hardly the language of an administration preparing an easy return!News Subscription Service

Security threats, regional competition and geography have repeatedly pulled Afghanistan back onto the US agenda.

Former US Ambassador Ronald E Neumann did not dismiss the possibility. “Yes, I can imagine that,” he noted in an interview, but his operative phrase was “real actions for real actions.” An embassy should not be exchanged for promises, and the Taliban would first have to make measurable changes, particularly on women and girls. “If you do things like opening an embassy without getting anything in return,” Neumann warned, Kabul would conclude that it could simply “stay put” until Washington changed its position. Will the US Flag Fly Again in Kabul? Dure Akram

The Taliban, meanwhile, have learned how to obtain many benefits of recognition without it. Russia formally recognised their government in July 2025. China has accepted a Taliban-appointed ambassador without recognition. India upgraded its Kabul mission to an embassy in October 2025. The European Union still withholds recognition, yet maintains a representation in Kabul and, in June, held its first Brussels talks with a Taliban delegation. Just last week, another Taliban delegation arrived in Germany to work on deportation arrangements.


Former Pakistani diplomat Najm us Saqib captured this in a recent opinion article, “Ghost Government”, as he noted how de facto control is outweighing de jure legitimacy. Ambassador M Alam Brohi made the same realist case when I asked him about Neumann’s remarks. “Obviously the US cannot write off Afghanistan forever,” he said. How long can Washington keep its distance from a country bordering Iran, China and Central Asia while Russia, China, India and Europe build working relationships with Kabul?History

Still, engagement does not amount to an embassy. Former US diplomat Jon Danilowicz sharply rejected suggestions that reopening is near. “I see no prospect that the US will be reopening the embassy in the near future,” he told me, describing some reporting as “mainly clickbait.”

The central obstacle remains what Washington would receive in return. Afghanistan is the only country where girls and women are formally barred from secondary and higher education. UNESCO now estimates 2.4 million girls have been excluded from secondary education by 2026. The March release of American Dennis Coyle also failed to persuade Washington to lift its designation of Afghanistan as a state sponsor of wrongful detention. An embassy opened now would give Kabul a major symbolic victory while leaving Washington struggling to name the concession it secured. Will the US Flag Fly Again in Kabul? Dure Akram

Then there is terrorism, simultaneously the strongest argument for contact and against normalisation. A UN monitoring report this year said no member state accepted the Taliban claim that there were no terrorist groups in Afghanistan: Al-Qaeda continued to enjoy Taliban patronage, while TTP remained one of the largest terrorist groups operating there. A US inspector-general report likewise said Taliban sanctuary for TTP and uneven enforcement contributed to persistent cross-border violence.

All this has become extraordinarily important for Islamabad, which continues to make a case on the global stage regarding the TTP sanctuaries based in Afghanistan driving attacks inside Pakistan. The dispute has already produced Pakistani airstrikes and cross-border retaliation. Pakistani-American analyst Faiz Rehman told me renewed American engagement could help if it imposed enforceable counterterrorism conditions. But on an imminent breakthrough, his answer was blunt: “Not really, not soon.”Regional News Updates

There is also an under-discussed American problem. Washington conducts Afghanistan diplomacy from Doha and much of its over-the-horizon counterterrorism from outside the country. A US oversight report published this year said American forces conduct counterterrorism operations principally from bases in Qatar. The arrangement leaves the United States with less direct visibility than rivals with diplomats on the ground.

Veteran US diplomat Robin Raphel argues that a Kabul presence could improve access to minerals, deepen Central Asian ties and counter China and Russia. “But that requires hands-on engagement through a U.S. presence in Kabul.”

Michael Kugelman of the Atlantic Council similarly notes that minerals are precisely the kind of commercial pitch likely to interest White House. Yet Washington spent nearly $1 billion trying to develop Afghan mining between 2004 and 2021 with little tangible progress.

Meanwhile, US President Trump has repeatedly said he wants the air base back and last year warned that “bad things” could happen if Afghanistan refused. The Taliban continue to rule out any renewed foreign military presence. Kabul is therefore offering minerals and an embassy while Washington wants concrete security concessions and the Taliban seek legitimacy, sanctions relief and frozen assets. Will the US Flag Fly Again in Kabul? Dure Akram


There is now another voice in Washington that makes the debate harder to dismiss. Aisha Wahab, recently elected as the first Afghan American member of Congress, argues for diplomacy regardless of who governs Afghanistan and says engagement should be used to press on women’s rights and civil rights. Her point for advocates of isolation is simple: five years without an embassy have not reopened girls’ schools.

There is some historical precedent for caution. Washington closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989 as the Soviet withdrawal neared completion, and did not reopen it until January 2002. History does not mean another return is inevitable. It does show, nonetheless, that American disengagement from Afghanistan has rarely settled the Afghan question for Washington. Security threats, regional competition and geography have repeatedly pulled the country back onto the US agenda. Will the US Flag Fly Again in Kabul? Dure Akram

That may eventually make some form of presence in Kabul useful again. But there is a considerable distance between talking to the Taliban and recognising their government. A liaison office, expanded technical contacts or a limited diplomatic presence could give Washington greater access without handing Kabul the legitimacy it has been seeking. For now, an American embassy remains unlikely. But five years after the withdrawal, the debate has shifted subtly from whether Washington should deal with the Taliban at all to how, where, and on what terms it should do so. The door is not open. It is no longer quite as firmly shut, either.

SOURCE:https://dailytimes.com.pk/1546767/will-the-us-flag-fly-again-in-kabul/

SOURCE:https://tribune.com.pk/story/2627126/area-study-centres-the-academic-wilderness

The New Uzbekistan By: Furqat Sidikov, and Andrew C. Kuchins Thirty-five years after gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan is looking to become a critical minerals, transport, and technology hub.
Editor’s Note: On August 31, Center for the National Interest Senior Fellow Andrew Kuchins interviewed the ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Furqat Sidikov, to discuss the US-Uzbek relations, Uzbekistan’s critical minerals strategy, its relationship with Afghanistan, and its approach to the upcoming G20 and C5+1 summits. The following conversation has been edited for style and clarity.

Andrew Kuchins (AK): Let me start by congratulating you and your country on 35 years of independence, marked on September 1 tomorrow. Please share your thoughts about the significance of this landmark, which also coincides with the 250th anniversary of the birth of the United States of America.

Furqat Sidikov (FS): Thank you for your kind words. We deeply appreciate the congratulations from our American friends. Let me also warmly congratulate the American people on the 250th anniversary of their independence. It is a special year for both our nations.

For Uzbekistan, 35 years of independence represent the freedom to shape our own future. This anniversary is an opportunity to honor our people’s achievements and look ahead with confidence.

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Today, we speak of a “New Uzbekistan” because our country is undergoing a profound transformation. Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s leadership, Uzbekistan has become more open, dynamic, and connected to the world. Reforms are creating greater opportunities for entrepreneurs, expanding access to education, and improving public services. Our young people bring energy, talent, and ambition to this process.

Uzbekistan is increasingly a driving force for development and cooperation in Central Asia. We are strengthening friendships with our neighbors, building new connections, and working together on shared challenges. There is still much to do, but our direction is clear: a prosperous country where development brings meaningful improvements to people’s lives.

Turning to the United States, American support for Uzbekistan’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity has always been a central pillar of our partnership. Since we established diplomatic relations on February 19, 1992, that commitment has carried lasting significance for our country.

We deeply appreciate how much our relationship has grown in both depth and scope in recent years. Today, we enjoy an enhanced strategic partnership. President Mirziyoyev and President Donald Trump have met several times and held several telephone conversations. Their direct dialogue has strengthened trust and provided clear direction for our cooperation.

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That strong political foundation is supporting a broader economic partnership. Cooperation is expanding in investment, energy, critical minerals, technology, and education.

There is also a special cultural expression of this friendship. To mark America’s anniversary, President Mirziyoyev has presented two traditional Uzbek gazebos, known as aywans, as a gift to the president and people of the United States. Beautifully handcrafted by Uzbek artisans, they will be installed in the new National Garden of American Heroes. They will stand as a lasting symbol of friendship and mutual support between our nations, sharing a part of Uzbekistan’s culture and hospitality with American visitors.

As we celebrate independence, we look forward to building on this trust and creating lasting opportunities for both our peoples.

AK: The past year, maybe starting with the historic C5+1 meeting in Washington in November last year, has seen tremendous progress in US-Uzbek bilateral relations. What has made this such a successful year?

FS: I would point to three things: strong political commitment, growing mutual economic interests, and practical follow-through.

First, President Mirziyoyev and President Trump have given this relationship clear direction. Their meetings in New York and later at the White House in November, followed by continued telephone conversations, have strengthened trust and maintained momentum.

During these exchanges, the presidents discussed an ambitious commercial package worth $105 billion over 10 years. The nearer-term commitments involve approximately $35 billion in purchases and investments. These are commitments to be implemented step by step, and both governments are working to translate them into concrete results.

Second, Uzbekistan’s reforms and openness have created more opportunities for American businesses. Our interests increasingly meet in aviation, critical minerals, energy, agriculture, infrastructure, and technology. Mutual benefit is the foundation: Uzbekistan gains investment, expertise, and new opportunities, while American companies gain customers and long-term partners.

Third, we are building mechanisms to support implementation. The US-Uzbekistan Business and Investment Council, launched in Washington in April, provides a forum for our governments and businesses to identify opportunities and address obstacles.

Another important step was the joint investment platform launched during the Tashkent International Investment Forum in June. As Uzbekistan’s investment minister explained, the financing framework brings together the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Export-Import Bank (EXIM) on the American side and Uzbekistan’s Fund for Reconstruction and Development on our side. It is intended to support industrial and infrastructure projects and give business partnerships practical financial backing.

We are also making it easier for Americans to visit Uzbekistan through visa-free travel, supporting tourism, business contacts, and friendships between our people.

There is a broader change as well: Washington increasingly sees Uzbekistan and Central Asia as partners with their own priorities and opportunities. Our responsibility now is to sustain this trust and turn commitments into lasting results.

AK: As a former collegiate and then club soccer player, I cannot avoid asking you about the importance of Uzbekistan qualifying for the World Cup this year for the first time and being able to play in the United States?

FS: This was a moment of great pride for Uzbekistan. Reaching the World Cup for the first time fulfilled a dream shared by generations of players and supporters. What made the experience especially meaningful was the support from across Central Asia. In the stadiums, we saw our compatriots standing alongside supporters from neighboring countries, cheering for Uzbekistan together. It felt like a shared regional celebration. We are deeply grateful to everyone who supported our team.

We also appreciated the warmth and interest of American fans. Football gave many Americans a reason to discover Uzbekistan for the first time. We thank the United States for hosting this important event, together with Canada and Mexico, and for welcoming our players and supporters.

The attention extended beyond the stadiums. According to the Tourism Committee, one measure of Google search interest linked to Uzbekistan’s World Cup participation rose by 450 percent. The accompanying tourism campaign generated more than 1.07 billion media impressions. This gave Uzbekistan valuable international exposure and an opportunity to attract future visitors.

Our sporting achievements also extend beyond football, including success in boxing and judo. Most recently, our sportsmen became world champions in the lightweight men’s double sculls, winning Uzbekistan’s first senior World Rowing Championships gold medal. Their achievement is another source of pride and inspiration for young athletes.

We hope people who discover Uzbekistan through sport will come to see Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva, experience our hospitality, and get to know our people.

For us, the World Cup was more than a sporting milestone. It brought people together and opened the door to new friendships.

AK: For the first time, US-Uzbek commercial relations are really taking off now. How important is the growth of private sector ties between our two countries for Tashkent? What measures is Uzbekistan taking to improve its investment environment, and where does WTO accession fit into this agenda?

FS: Private sector ties are essential to the future of our partnership. Governments can open doors, but businesses create jobs, introduce technologies, and build lasting commercial relationships.

President Mirziyoyev’s reforms have helped strengthen a new generation of Uzbek entrepreneurs, giving private businesses a greater role in our economy. In March last year, the president noted that small and medium-sized enterprises employed 10.5 million people. This shows how important entrepreneurship has become for livelihoods across Uzbekistan.

We are working to make the investment environment more open and predictable by reducing state ownership, expanding opportunities for private investment, and strengthening investor protection. We are also developing the Tashkent International Financial Centre, with a framework based on English common law and plans for an independent commercial court. Investors need clear rules and reliable ways to resolve disputes.

These changes are helping Uzbekistan develop into an important IT hub in Central Asia. Our companies provide software, digital solutions, and outsourcing services to international customers, including American businesses. IT Park residents’ service exports reached $392.5 million in the first half of this year, an increase over the same period last year. This is their worldwide export total, with the United States an important market.

Importantly, investment is beginning to move in both directions. One of Uzbekistan’s leading industrial companies has begun construction of a manufacturing facility in Kentucky, with an announced overall investment plan of approximately $600 million. This is a concrete example of Uzbek businesses expanding internationally and creating opportunities in the United States.

WTO accession is central to our reform agenda. It supports clearer trade rules, simpler procedures, and fairer competition. For American businesses, it should bring greater predictability when exporting to Uzbekistan or investing in local production.

Our goal remains to complete accession this year, while resolving the outstanding issues with WTO members. Membership matters, but consistently implementing our commitments will be equally important.

Ultimately, we want a partnership in which businesses from both countries can invest, grow, and succeed together.

AK: The United States faces large challenges to diversify its sources of critical minerals both for commercial and defense high technology production. Uzbekistan has extensive reserves that can help meet these needs, and diversification of consumers is good business for Tashkent as well. How is this aspect of the partnership developing?

FS: This is becoming an important area of our partnership because our interests complement each other. The United States wants more reliable and diverse sources of critical minerals. Uzbekistan wants to develop its resources, attract advanced technology, and expand its export markets.

Our national program, announced last year, includes 76 projects with planned investment of $2.6 billion. We see significant opportunities for American companies to participate in this broader development effort.

Our goal goes beyond exporting raw materials. We want to expand processing and manufacturing in Uzbekistan, create skilled jobs, and supply materials needed by modern industries. American technology, expertise, and investment can make an important contribution.

Copper provides a concrete example. At the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex, the first stage of the MOF-3 copper processing plant was launched this March, incorporating technologies from leading suppliers, including FLSmidth. Further expansion is planned through MOF-4. These projects support our national goal of increasing annual copper production to 500,000 tonnes by 2030, strengthening Uzbekistan’s role in international supply chains.

Developing our specialists is equally important. We are working with the Colorado School of Mines on a Center of Excellence in geology, mining, and critical minerals at the University of Geological Sciences in Tashkent. This cooperation brings together joint research, modern exploration and processing technologies, and exchanges for students and specialists. We want our young people to gain the knowledge and practical skills needed to develop these resources responsibly.

We are also strengthening the framework for bilateral cooperation. This February, our governments signed a memorandum on critical mineral supply chains, covering mining and processing. The joint investment platform announced by DFC in June includes critical minerals among its priorities and provides another mechanism to help mobilize investment.

Our priority now is to turn these agreements into commercially sound projects, supported by financing, reliable transport, and strong environmental and safety standards.

We want American companies to become long-term partners in developing this industry. For Uzbekistan, that means skilled jobs, greater processing capacity, and wider export markets. For the United States, it means additional, reliable sources of essential materials. This gives both sides a clear interest in making the partnership succeed.

AK: There are two major events in the final four months of this year for US-Central Asia relations: first, the C-5+1 Foreign Ministerial meeting in Samarkand, and second, the G-20 in Florida where Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev will be participating. What are you working on accomplishing in conjunction with these two key events?

FS: Both meetings are important opportunities to advance practical cooperation. They also reflect the attention the US administration is giving to Central Asia. We are preparing carefully, but our work goes beyond the events themselves.

The close relationship between President Mirziyoyev and President Trump has given our partnership strong momentum. It has helped bring our businesses and people closer together. It has also encouraged us to establish new mechanisms that give cooperation a more lasting foundation, including the US-Uzbekistan Business and Investment Council and the joint investment platform. Our partnership is becoming more mature, better organized, and increasingly focused on concrete results.

In Samarkand, we want to strengthen cooperation on trade, transport, energy, and regional security. Uzbekistan assumes the C5+1 co-chairmanship in September, and our priority will be to make this format deliver practical benefits. We will work closely with the United States and all our Central Asian partners.

For the G20, we are focused on advancing our bilateral economic agenda and contributing to discussions on growth and innovation. In June, the reported portfolio of projects being implemented in Uzbekistan with American companies included 77 projects worth $35 billion. We want to help these projects move forward and identify new opportunities.

Infrastructure is one priority. The new Tashkent International Airport is designed to serve 20 million passengers annually. We are working with American financial institutions to advance cooperation on major projects like this.

At the same time, our embassy is organizing visits by regional governors to the United States to build direct business relationships. We will continue working with business associations in both countries to connect companies and address practical concerns.

We also plan to expand our consular presence. Additional consulates general would help us better serve our compatriots and develop business ties across more American states.

Cultural and educational cooperation remains an important part of our agenda. Under Secretary Rogers’s visit to Uzbekistan in June provided an opportunity to deepen these ties. We want to build on that through exchanges and partnerships between institutions.

These developments give us confidence in the future of our relationship. Our task is to ensure that the trust between our presidents translates into lasting partnerships between our institutions, businesses, and people.

AK: On September 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping will be in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan for the annual SCO meeting. Russian and Chinese leaders are in Central Asia at least once a year. No sitting US president has ever visited. A presidential visit is long overdue. Is this one of Uzbekistan’s major goals for 2027, and how optimistic are you that it will happen?

FS: Yes, welcoming a US president to Uzbekistan is an important goal for us. We believe the development of our partnership provides a strong foundation for such a visit.

President Mirziyoyev personally invited President Trump during their meetings in New York and Washington. He renewed that invitation during their telephone conversation on August 7. Uzbekistan would warmly welcome President Trump, and we will continue working closely with the US administration on this.

We are hopeful about the possibility of a visit in 2027. At the same time, the timing must be agreed by both sides, and we should not get ahead of those discussions. There is no confirmed date to announce.

Such a visit would be historic as the first by a sitting American president. But its importance would go well beyond symbolism. It would provide an opportunity to advance concrete cooperation in investment, energy, technology, education, and regional connectivity.

We see this as a natural next step in our relationship with the United States. Uzbekistan values its partnerships with its neighbors and other major countries, and we want our American partnership to develop on its own strong foundation of trust and mutual benefit.

A visit would also give the American president an opportunity to see Uzbekistan’s transformation firsthand and experience the warmth of our people. We would want it to leave a lasting legacy through practical agreements and stronger connections between our societies.

So yes, we are optimistic, and we are ready to do the work needed to make such a visit meaningful for both countries.

AK: Uzbekistan has been a leading regional country constructively engaging Afghanistan. Could you discuss Tashkent’s approach to its neighbor?

FS: Afghanistan is our close neighbor, and Uzbekistan’s position is to pursue constructive engagement and support its peaceful development. In his address marking the anniversary of our independence, President Mirziyoyev reaffirmed that Uzbekistan would continue this constructive policy.

We believe Afghanistan must not be isolated. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025, our president emphasized that helping the Afghan people achieve a peaceful and stable life requires a united international effort.

An important part of this approach is connecting Afghanistan with the wider region. At the Central Asian leaders’ Consultative Meeting in November 2025, President Mirziyoyev called for Afghanistan’s integration into regional infrastructure, energy, and transport projects. Uzbekistan has also proposed a dedicated UN resolution on developing international transport and energy corridors through Afghan territory.

Humanitarian assistance is another practical part of our policy. For example, on May 25 this year, Uzbekistan delivered nearly 215 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, including food and other essential supplies. According to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this was the second humanitarian shipment sent to the Afghan people in 2026. The assistance was intended for communities affected by severe flooding in northern Afghanistan.

We also help facilitate international relief efforts. The international logistics hub in Termez, established in 2022 at our president’s initiative, supports humanitarian deliveries to Afghanistan and other countries. In 2025, it joined the UN Refugee Agency’s global stockpile network. Dialogue on shared natural resources is equally important. In April 2026, President Mirziyoyev called for stronger constructive engagement with Afghanistan on climate, ecology, agriculture, and water management.

These priorities define our approach: preventing isolation, supporting the Afghan people, and involving Afghanistan in practical regional cooperation.

About the Authors: Furqat Sidikov and Andrew Kuchins
Ambassador Furqat Sidikov is the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United States of America. He previously served as Uzbekistan’s first deputy minister of foreign affairs, where he supervised bilateral cooperation with countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as ambassador to Pakistan.

Andrew C. Kuchins is a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He has served as president of the American University of Central Asia and the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center as well as the Russia and Eurasia Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author or editor of seven books and published columns for The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and many other media outlets.

SOURCE: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/the-new-uzbekistan

Why Europe Isn’t Ready for NATO 3.0 By Peter Doran US retrenchment from Europe, even if premised on European burden-sharing, will expose the continent to Russian aggression.
The Trump administration’s anticipated reduction of US forces from Europe hit a reality check last week. Two overlapping missions, one by CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow and one by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to Stuttgart and Brussels, inadvertently exposed potential flaws in the Pentagon’s ongoing retrenchment strategy. While Ratcliffe was in Moscow reportedly to dissuade an expected Russian attack on NATO, Colby was preparing allies for their new role: assuming primary responsibility for deterring the Kremlin with conventional combat power. The timing and purpose of both missions highlight major questions that the transition to “NATO 3.0” has not yet answered.

On paper, NATO 3.0 is meant to strengthen Europe’s armed forces after decades of neglect. Announced in February 2026, it closely follows the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy (NDS). Under this plan, the United States will transfer primary responsibility for conventional deterrence to European allies. After shifting away from Europe, Washington will retain its traditional role as the backbone of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.

It is a classic retrenchment strategy. This requires regional allies to replace American armored brigade combat teams, logistical enablers, deep-strike capabilities, and supporting infrastructure hubs in Germany and Italy, and all before the Kremlin’s reconstituted forces could exploit any gaps. The catch: Europe may need a generation before it is ready to take the helm, while Russia already benefits from hard-earned lessons in Ukraine and a mobilized defense-industrial base.

Inside the Department of Defense, money is the main driver. The NDS anticipates that America’s debt burden will make future defense cuts inevitable; therefore, retrenchment today will keep America solvent tomorrow. One question that the official strategy has not answered, however: under what conditions does this withdrawal from Europe generate vulnerabilities that undermine its intended gains? Ratcliffe’s unannounced trip to Moscow suggests Russia is already preparing to probe the alliance before retrenchment is complete.

In Washington, President Donald Trump dismissed Ratcliffe’s intervention in Moscow as “sort of semi-routine,” downplaying its significance. The record suggests otherwise. William Burns was the last CIA director to visit Moscow; in 2021, he tried and failed to prevent the Kremlin’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. Before that, John Brennan traveled to Russia in March 2016 to settle US-Russian activities in Syria. Ratcliffe’s 2026 trip fits the same, high-
According to published reports, his visit was “primarily to warn Russia against any escalatory action against the Baltic States.” This raises another question: If allies replace the United States as the primary conventional deterrent to Russian aggression, as the Pentagon intends, will they also replace the high-stakes diplomatic and intelligence missions that previously fell to the CIA director; and if so, who?

Instead of engaging an aggressive adversary, Colby’s simultaneous mission was to offer a “consultative” olive branch to allies. He also intended to sort out many of the technical and timing questions that the Pentagon’s retrenchment strategy will likely raise. “We want to be able to talk through the pros and cons of a variety of different force levels or dispositions,” a Pentagon official said to Reuters.

The United States has circulated a “Terms of Reference,” which reportedly lays out how Washington will evaluate whether allies can meet their defense spending commitments, as well as their willingness to provide “access, basing, and overflight” (ABO) rights to the United States in a post-retrenchment environment. Highlighting this as a priority, Colby stressed the ABO issue during his public comments with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

The Trump administration is clearly sensitive to ABO vulnerabilities in a post-retrenchment Europe. During Operation Epic Fury, Spain, France, Italy, and initially the United Kingdom denied the United States airspace and basing access for operations against Iran. That episode prompted Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a longtime Atlanticist, to publicly question the logic of the alliance: “Why are we in NATO? Why do we send trillions of dollars… if in our time of need, we won’t be allowed to use those bases?”

The administration’s retrenchment strategy rests on a significant expectation. While Colby wants to shift “irreversibly” toward a primarily European defense, he simultaneously expects negative allied responses to be reversible on demand from Washington. When the United States requires assistance or access for out-of-area operations, for example, the current strategy assumes that the old, predictable infrastructure of the alliance will simply “snap back” into place. On command, airspace and basing access would be granted as though nothing had changed. This assumption introduces yet another question: What happens when allies don’t “snap back” and America’s ABO options shrink across Europe?

For now, these and other questions remain unanswered. Colby is expected to provide Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with four options for reordering America’s force posture in Europe by November 6. In the meantime, he is threading a needle with allies. “The United States is not leaving the continent. It’s not leaving NATO,” he stressed on his final day in Europe. That much is encouraging. How much or how little will remain could determine the future of Europe’s security architecture, and Trump will have the last word.

About the Author: Peter Doran
Peter Doran is an adjunct senior fellow focused on Russia, Ukraine, and transatlantic relations at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. A recognized expert on Russia, Ukraine, and transatlantic relations, Doran has testified before Congress on topics covering geopolitics, energy security, and state-sponsored disinformation. His work has appeared in Time, Foreign Policy, Defense News, National Review, and The Hill. He is also the author of Breaking Rockefeller (Penguin, 2017). Why Europe Isn’t Ready for NATO 3.0 By Peter Doran

SOURCE:https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-europe-isnt-ready-for-nato-3-0

Is Gen Z really asleep? By Dr Intikhab Ulfat. For some time, I have been writing in these pages about generations: Generation X, Millennials, Gen Z, Gen Alpha and even the emerging Generation Beta. Each time I return to the subject, I become more reluctant to judge one generation by the standards of another. Generations do not grow in isolation. They are shaped by their homes, classrooms, institutions and, above all, the opportunities society places before them.

Having spent nearly three decades as a university teacher, I have had the privilege of watching generational change unfold inside the classroom. I taught students who entered university before smartphones transformed everyday life, and I now teach young people for whom the digital world is inseparable from reality. This experience makes me cautious about describing Pakistan's Gen Z simply as passive, indifferent, or asleep.

My students are often remarkably aware of what surrounds them. They discuss unemployment, inequality, corruption, climate change, politics and institutional failures. They have access to information at a speed unimaginable when my generation was young. I have frequently heard questions in classrooms that are sharper and more direct than those students asked two decades ago. Yet awareness does not necessarily become collective action. Is Gen Z really asleep? By Dr Intikhab Ulfat

We often encourage young people to think critically while simultaneously rewarding obedience at school, university and home. My experience as a teacher suggests that students are not short of opinions or awareness; many simply remain uncertain about where they can express them safely. Before calling Gen Z silent or passive, we should ask whether our institutions genuinely provide space for questioning, disagreement and independent thought.

There is another important difference. Protest itself has changed. For Generation X, public engagement was largely physical: student organisations, meetings, demonstrations, pamphlets and debates. Gen Z inhabits a hybrid public sphere. A hashtag, video, online petition or digital campaign may be its first language of dissent. We may regard this as superficial activism, but digital mobilisation can influence public conversations. Is Gen Z really asleep? By Dr Intikhab Ulfat

Yet we should not romanticise it either. Clicking, sharing and commenting cannot permanently substitute for civic participation. A functioning society needs citizens willing to organise peacefully, question institutions, demand transparency and defend the rights of others.

But courage also depends upon hope. A young graduate facing unemployment, rising living costs and uncertain prospects may reasonably wonder whether challenging the system will improve anything or merely create another obstacle. When merit appears negotiable, and accountability selective, silence may be less a sign of laziness than a strategy for survival. Over the years, I have seen talented students become cautious not because they lack ideas, but because they are unsure whether institutions reward integrity or punish inconvenience. Is Gen Z really asleep? By Dr Intikhab Ulfat

Universities therefore carry a special responsibility. Education should produce neither obedient subjects nor permanently angry citizens. It should create individuals capable of examining evidence, disagreeing without hostility and asking difficult questions. I increasingly believe one of the finest moments in teaching occurs not when a student reproduces the correct answer, but when one respectfully asks why the accepted answer should be accepted at all.

Gen Z has weaknesses, as every generation does. Its attention can be fragmented, its dependence on technology excessive, and digital outrage short-lived. But it is also informed, connected, adaptive, and increasingly unwilling to accept inherited assumptions without examination.

Instead of asking only why our young people remain silent, perhaps my generation should ask a more uncomfortable question: what environment have we created for them to find their voice?

Pakistan needs neither a permanently rebellious generation nor a sleeping one. It needs young citizens who understand that citizenship lies somewhere between obedience and outrage, in informed questioning, peaceful participation, and the courage to demand better. Is Gen Z really asleep? By Dr Intikhab Ulfat

If Gen Z appears asleep, shouting at it to wake up is not enough. We must also open the doors through which an awakened generation can walk.

SOURCE:https://tribune.com.pk/story/2627125/is-gen-z-really-asleep

Managing external debt by Ishrat Husain. Pakistan’s debt has crossed Rs100 trillion, raising doubts about the stabilisation programme’s veracity. First, it’s not advisable to use absolute amounts or per capita debt. The correct way is to use indicators that relate public debt stock and debt servicing to national income, exports of goods and services, revenues, total foreign exchange earnings, and foreign exchange reserves to gauge the future capacity to discharge these obligations.

To begin with, clarify the various definitions that have created a lot of confusion in laymen’s minds. Pakistan’s total debt and liabilities consist of public debt and private debt. Public debt accounted for 91 per cent of the total stock of outstanding debt and liabilities on June 30, 2026. The remaining 9 per cent is private debt, mostly to borrowers abroad, for which the government has no fiscal obligation. However, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has to provide foreign exchange to service this debt. Managing external debt by Ishrat Husain

Within the gross public debt, the government’s share was almost 92%, while the balance was owed by public enterprises but guaranteed by the government. Borrowing from the IMF is also included in the gross public debt, although it is the SBP’s liability. The total debt and liabilities are made up of borrowings in rupees from the SBP, banks, national savings schemes, prize bonds, Sukuk, etc., and borrowings in foreign currency from multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, ADB, IDB, bilateral governments or global financial markets in the form of Eurobonds or Sukuk.

Rupee-denominated borrowing is termed ‘domestic debt’ and foreign currency-denominated borrowing ‘external debt’. Domestic debt risks are different from those of external debt. Lumping them together is analytically incorrect. While both create debt-servicing liability for budgetary purposes and thus affect fiscal balances, the risk profile of each is quite different. Domestic debt has to be paid in rupees, which can be printed, or the central bank can acquire those obligations on its balance sheet by creating reserve money. It involves creating possible inflationary pressures, but there is no risk of default — a real threat in the case of foreign currency-denominated debt. Countries that have suffered debt crises have faced solvency and liquidity risks in servicing their foreign currency loans. Risks from domestic debt include rollover risk, interest rate risk, and crowding out of private-sector credit. Here, we’ll focus largely on external debt and liabilities and their servicing. Managing external debt by Ishrat Husain

The reform journey to increase exports, investment, and productivity must be accelerated.

Pakistan’s external debt and liabilities amount to $139 billion, of which public sector debt accounts for almost two-thirds and the private sector one-third. In the public sector, direct government debt is 80pc of the total. What are the diagnostic vulnerability indicators of the stock of EDL and debt-servicing capacity? First is the breakdown between medium- and long-term and short-term loans. In our case, the ratio is 88% MLT and 12 ST. Official liquid reserves are enough to cover the ST loans and loans maturing during the year. However, the rollover of friendly country deposits next year will go up to $12bn again. Second is concessionality — the average interest rate, years to maturity, and proportion of fixed-rate loans. The higher the element of concessionality, the stronger the safety valve. Fifty per cent of loans are concessional, showing a downward slide from past ratios. Other stock indicators don’t look healthy. Third, the EDL-to-GDP ratio has moved from 24pc to 31pc in the last decade. Fourth, EDL-to-export of goods and services has also worsened — from 210 to 340. Fifth, EDL-to-foreign exchange earnings shows an upward movement from 100 to 168 — not a satisfactory trend. Sixth, EDL-to-foreign exchange reserves has shot up alarmingly from 350 to 750, despite a build-up of reserves in the last two years.

Debt-servicing indicators show that external debt servicing-to-GDP has risen from 1.7pc to 4pc, while EDS-to-exports of goods and services has more than doubled from 18pc to 44pc. So have EDS-to-foreign exchange earnings, from 10pc to 22pc, and EDS-to-foreign exchange reserves, from 37pc to 98pc. Managing external debt By Ishrat Husain

This picture shows that to exit the IMF programme after October 2027, palliative measures are needed over the next two years to relieve the debt situation and build up capacity to absorb shocks. There are four levers to reduce the ratios: a) faster growth of exports and foreign exchange earnings; b) faster GDP growth in US dollars; c) lower current account deficits; and (d) lower interest and refinancing costs via concessional financing and maturity extension.

Assuming 4pc GDP growth in FY27-29, inflation contained at 6.5pc, fiscal deficit of 2.9pc and primary surplus of 2pc, the target should be to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60pc and external debt-to-GDP ratio to 25pc by FY29 by implementing these policy measures: a) export of goods to reach $40bn rather than $36bn — a $4bn increase; b) import of goods to reach $76bn instead of $79bn — savings of $3bn; c) export of services to move up to $12bn instead of $11bn — a $1bn increase; d) workers’ remittances to go up to $46bn instead of $43bn — an increase of $3bn; and e) an FDI of $3.7bn rather than $2.7bn — a jump of $1bn.

The reform journey to increase exports, investment and productivity must be accelerated. The list of delayed and deferred decisions is long. To mention a few — reducing the tax burden and overregulation of manufacturing and export, upgrading oil refineries, third-party access to oil exploration companies, introduction of weighted average cost of gas, opening up retail electricity and gas business to the private sector, elimination of cross-subsidy from industrial to domestic consumers rather than targeting through BISP, the ML-I railway track (announced in 2015), the Sukkur-Hyderabad motorway, increased share of railway freight traffic, tax collection under agriculture income tax, property tax, GST on professional services, operationalising Exim Bank for export financing and insurance, streamlining FBR’s export facilitation scheme, expeditious ref­u­­nds to exporters, increasing productivity of small­­holder agriculture, financial access for SMEs, agriculture, low-cost housing, and SEZs for CPEC 2.0. The announcement and implementation of the industrial policy can help achieve the outlined increases and savings in the external account.

The amount of $12bn can be used to liquidate the bilateral deposits if they are not swapped for equity in long-gestation investment projects or their maturities are not extended to the long term. By FY29, the removal of this Damocles sword over our heads should be able to moderate the vulnerability indicators discussed earlier. We don’t have to seek another loan from the IMF and can regain our economic sovereignty. Managing external debt By Ishrat Husain

SOURCE:https://www.dawn.com/news/2027100/managing-external-debt

The Trump Administration’s Pivot Away from the Indo-Pacific By By: Husain Haqqani, and Aparna Pande Without much debate or consultation with allies, the White House has executed a critical change in US China strategy.
For the last several years, US presidents and other officials talked about a pivot to Asia in America’s foreign and national security policy, designed to limit China’s rising influence. The first Trump administration defined the region where it would expand US presence and contain China as the “Indo-Pacific.” But the Trump administration now appears to be gradually dismantling the security architecture created for that purpose. Without saying as much, the United States seems to be shifting its focus away from the Indo-Pacific, and possibly even from the notion of containing China except through economic measures.

The Hawaii-based unified combatant command, named US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018, was renamed US Pacific Command in June 2026, signaling a more limited defensive role than earlier envisaged. The Quad, comprising Australia, Japan, India, and the United States, was meant to be the core of an Asian NATO but has, in the administration’s eyes, effectively lost significance.

Speaking in Manila in August 2026, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby implied that US Indo-Pacific ambitions might have represented “high-flown abstractions and comfortable illusions of permanent unipolarity.” He also tried to tie it to the “legacy foreign policy of the post-Cold War period,” calling it “out of date and ill-advised,” without acknowledging that President Donald Trump embraced maintaining American primacy in the Indo-Pacific during his first term.

The end of the pivot to Asia and the Indo-Pacific strategy is a major shift in US policy. Still, like many other major shifts under this administration, it has been executed without focused debate. There are some unanswered questions. Does American grand strategy (if there is one) no longer seek to prevent China’s rise as a peer competitor? Or is dominance of the Indo-Pacific no longer deemed to be the key to keeping China’s rising power in check?

It would be understandable if someone argued that preventing the rise of a peer competitor is no longer feasible, but no one in the administration has publicly made that argument. That China’s rise cannot be checked without maintaining freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific with the support of allies is so obvious that no one will probably try to suggest the alternative as a policy option.

The second Trump administration has reversed course from the first Trump administration, which championed the bipartisan strategic concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific. It identified the Quadrilateral Security grouping, or Quad, as the centerpiece of a network of alliances and partnerships in Asia, which it said were necessary to keep China’s ambitions in check.

Six years ago, in 2020, the United States military, with President Trump as commander-in-chief, designated China as the “primary pacing threat.” Then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl defined this in 2021: “China is the only country that can pose a systemic challenge to the United States in the sense of challenging us, economically, technologically, politically, and militarily.”

But the current Trump administration appears to view the region not as a principal area of competition, but as just another sphere where the United States competes with China. Instead of strengthening long-term, strategic partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries, the administration now prefers a transactional approach that lacks a grand strategy. This is clear from the speeches of high-ranking officials as well as the National Security and National Defense Strategies.

The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) suggests managing competition with China through reduced hostility and relative cooperation, rather than the long-term strategy argued in the 2017 NSS of the first Trump administration. The mercurial trade war between the United States and China in 2025 reflects a preference for dealmaking over mobilizing a coalition, backed by American hard power, for greater leverage.

While broader technological competition and the need to ensure resilient, reliable supply chains remain areas of friction, the current administration does not particularly highlight China as the threat to the United States. That may not be a bad thing, but it amounts to a key policy change without alerting allies or explaining it to the American people.

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Both the first Trump and Biden administrations recognized the need to cooperate with China as a global power, but they envisioned a mix of cooperation and competition. Previous administrations sought to create a comprehensive security architecture with Indo-Pacific allies and partners to deter Chinese aggression.

The Biden administration declared that US national interests were strengthened through “a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world.” Its National Defense Strategy emphasized Indo-Pacific multilateral organizations such as the Quad and AUKUS as part of the region’s broader security architecture. Similarly, in the western Indian Ocean, the administration supported the I2U2 minilateral comprising India, the UAE, Israel and the United States.

In 2023, the idea of an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) emerged, and the United States supported it to promote regional economic connectivity. All these groupings had a strategic underpinning: they were intended to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which helped China expand its influence over various countries through infrastructure development. The Trump Administration’s Pivot Away from the Indo-Pacific

The current administration appears uncommitted to this security and cooperation architecture. Like the US containment strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Indo-Pacific strategy was a construct aimed at China. The aim was not only to maintain American military, economic, and technological power, but also to build up the capabilities of allies and partners in the region and thereby prevent Chinese dominance over Asia.

The difference is visible when comparing the 2018, 2022, and 2026 National Defense Strategy documents. The first Trump administration recognized the need to strengthen alliances and partnerships to build “a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.”

The Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy called China’s “coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences” as the biggest threat facing the United States. But now the US goal is stated as seeking “a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China.” As in Europe, demands for burden-sharing and notions of burden-shifting have replaced the notion of US leadership in Asian security. The Trump Administration’s Pivot Away from the Indo-Pacific

At the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth castigated the Indo-Pacific as a region with “constant escalation, rhetorical theatrics, or a region defined by public confrontation.” The top American defense official called on Asian nations to increase their defense spending, noting that, moving forward, the United States would invest in its own capabilities, saying, “less Shangri-La, more ships.” Those ships will, obviously, take years to build, but in the meantime America’s regional partnerships might wither.

For now, the Quad, IMEC, I2U2, and AUKUS continue to exist, but Washington sees them through a purely transactional and operational prism. This transactional, mercurial approach to the Indo-Pacific is unlikely to produce a world order that is “fairer” to American interests. Without reliable and effective allies in Asia, the United States would yield the region to China’s pre-eminence. A major shift of this magnitude should not happen without adequate debate among Americans or discussions with allies.

About the Authors: Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande
Husain Haqqani, former ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, is diplomat-in-residence at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Amb. Haqqani is the author of four books: Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, India vs Pakistan: Why Can’t We Just Be Friends?, and Reimagining Pakistan: Transforming a Dysfunctional Nuclear State.

Aparna Pande is director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute. She is the author of Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India, From Chanakya to Modi: the Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy, The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan, and Making India Great: The Promise of a Reluctant Global Power.

SOURCE:https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-trump-administrations-pivot-away-from-the-indo-pacific

Suthra Punjab

Lahore entered September with anti-littering squads fanning out across 200 markets and major roads. For now, offenders receive warnings, but from October 1, dropping rubbish in public can bring fines of up to Rs 10,000, while burning waste or tyres can cost as much as Rs 500,000 and, in serious cases, carry imprisonment. Field officers have been barred from receiving cash. For a city that has spent decades complaining about rubbish, the government is finally attaching a price to producing it.

Punjab has earned some standing to become demanding. Suthra Punjab has taken organised collection into towns and villages where municipal sanitation barely existed, backed by enormous public spending, a large vehicle fleet and digital monitoring. Once the state begins collecting waste reliably, the resident who throws it back onto a road or into a drain is no longer merely exposing municipal failure. He is adding another public cost to a service taxpayers have already financed.

That cost becomes painfully visible every monsoon. Plastic bags and household refuse repeatedly find their way into Lahore’s drainage network, forcing public agencies to clear material that should never have entered it. Burning the same waste transfers the burden from the drain to the lungs. The heavier penalties for tyre and waste burning therefore make sense in a province already fighting severe air pollution.


The difficulty is that Suthra Punjab itself has acquired a ledger the government cannot ignore.

Only last week, workers in Faisalabad protested over salaries and dues, saying loader-rickshaw drivers had gone unpaid for one month and 16 days and that Eid honoraria remained outstanding. In July, a sanitation worker in Gujranwala died after setting himself on fire following allegations that a contractor had been illegally deducting from his monthly salary.

The Anti-Corruption Establishment alleged in May that digital records in Faisalabad had been manipulated in a Rs 1 billion fraud, involving ghost workers, inflated container numbers and facilities shown on paper but absent on the ground.

Even the programme’s vehicles have come under scrutiny. On Monday, Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz ordered strict compliance with traffic laws after expressing grief over a minor girl killed by a Suthra Punjab vehicle. The instruction was necessary for reasons larger than traffic management: authority loses moral force when the machinery enforcing public discipline appears exempt from it.

None of this weakens the case for e-challans. It strengthens the case for applying the same standard throughout the system.

The test of Suthra Punjab should never be the number of challans it issues. A successful sanitation system eventually needs fewer fines because government, contractors and citizens have all learned what is expected of them. *

Weaponising a lifeline

EDITORIAL: Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s remarks at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek that water must never be weaponised or used as an instrument of coercion merit attention and unequivocal agreement.

His warning comes as the management of shared water resources becomes an increasingly consequential dimension of regional security following India’s 2025 decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling a day earlier that the treaty remains in force reinforces the fundamental principle that such obligations cannot be discarded at political convenience.

The issue here, one must note, is the deeply troubling proposition that control over water can be used as a means of political pressure. As the prime minister put it, water is the lifeblood of the region.

Indeed, the principle is broader still: water, in fact, is the lifeblood of human existence. It sustains agriculture, ecosystems, industry and communities; and its availability determines whether societies prosper or struggle to survive.

Any attempt by a state to obstruct or manipulate the flow of an internationally shared water resource in violation of treaty obligations therefore carries consequences far more serious than an ordinary diplomatic dispute.

This is why Islamabad’s description of India’s action as an act of war is entirely justified. Since announcing its decision to hold the IWT in abeyance, New Delhi has created much uncertainty around river flows into Pakistan at critical stages of the agricultural cycle, while also approving hydropower projects over western rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty. For a water-stressed country whose economy depends heavily on the Indus River system, this is clearly an existential concern, with the potential damage extending well beyond farming. Pakistan’s agriculture supports millions of livelihoods and sustains a vast chain of economic activity, from fertiliser and seed markets to food processing, transport and rural commerce.

A significant disruption in water availability could therefore reverberate through the entire economy. Lower agricultural output would threaten farmers’ incomes, tighten food supplies and push up prices, while weaker production could hurt exports and the industries dependent on agricultural raw materials.

Water insecurity, then, could quickly become food, employment and economic insecurity.

One must note, though, that the implications here will not stay limited to Pakistan’s water and economic security. The delicate ecological balance of the entire Himalayan region will also be at risk.

The rivers originating in the Himalayas form an interconnected ecological system. Artificially altering river flows and accelerating interventions in fragile mountain environments can have consequences for ecosystems and communities across the region, and not just in Pakistan.

At a time when climate change is already intensifying glacier melt, floods, droughts and extreme weather, as tragically demonstrated by Nepal’s recent floods, further disruption of these systems could magnify risks for millions. There should, therefore, be no ambiguity about the key principles at stake here: international agreements governing shared waters are not optional arrangements to be invoked when convenient and discarded when circumstances change; and water cannot be treated as a geopolitical weapon simply because one country happens to control the upstream flows.

A deliberate attempt to deny populations access to an essential resource crosses a profoundly dangerous moral line, and where it violates international obligations and causes grave civilian harm raises serious questions under international law.

Pakistan must continue to defend its treaty rights through diplomatic and legal means, while urgently improving its own water storage, conservation and management. But the international community must also recognise the wider principle articulated by the prime minister: rivers cannot become weapons. In a warming and increasingly water-stressed world, treating them as such could endanger peace, human lives and the ecological future of entire regions.