The combination of Turkish industry, Saudi wealth, and Pakistani military know-how could create a formidable new defense industrial base.
On August 6, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed a historic defense pact—the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement—to adopt a common approach to regional threats. This long-anticipated coalition was formed to diversify dependence on the United States and create an opportunity for more regional defense cooperation. As allies, this is not an opportunistic “filling the vacuum” left by a reduced US presence but rather complements the already strong partnerships among Riyadh, Islamabad, and Ankara. Arabs& Middle Easterners

The diplomatic and military consequences of this alliance will be profound and frequently discussed; less so the massive opportunity it will create for the defense industrial base. The Mecca Pact could become a vertically integrated monolith.

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The headlines will be quick to note Saudi financial muscle and Turkish advanced drone technology, but as important is Pakistan’s less noted skills in value and scale in front-line combat vehicles, weapons and ammunition production. Even more important, Pakistan provides established depth in the overlooked Achilles’ heel of repair, maintenance, and support. Without it, keeping systems running beyond the first battle is nearly impossible. As Napoleon is alleged to have said, “Amateurs discuss tactics: the professionals discuss logistics.” Arabs& Middle Easterners

The Pakistan logistics enterprise goes back decades. Fifty years ago, the Pakistan defense sector was barely producing small arms and ammunition. It invested heavily in assembly, overhaul, and rebuild capabilities.

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Today, Pakistan is a rising powerhouse in the international defense market. It offers a full portfolio of exportable land, sea, and air systems, with a focus on scale and cost. Heavy Industries Taxila produces tracked and wheeled combat vehicles; the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex fields combat and training aircraft and UAVs for export; and the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works produces critical fleet support frigates, corvettes, and attack and patrol vessels.

The Mecca Pact will likely attempt to develop a joint export base with Saudi finance, Turkish high-end equipment, and Pakistan’s strengths in quality, scale, and cost. It has the potential to complement the United States, especially when competing for business in smaller countries with more limited budgets. While the United States will continue to sell expensive, high-end (and often over-engineered) systems, the Mecca Pact could still capture a large share of the low-end export market.

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With the United States beginning to confront its financial vulnerabilities and growing threats from China, a coalition of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey could serve as a natural complement for the withdrawing hegemon. Moreover, the Mecca Pact is an opportunity for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to create a new player in international defense manufacturing and trade.

About the Author: Mark Kimmitt
Mark Kimmitt is a retired US Army brigadier general. He served as assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs from 2008 to 2009 and as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East. Kimmitt graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, earned an MBA from Harvard Business School, and received master’s degrees from the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the National Defense University.

SOURCE:https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/how-the-mecca-pact-shifts-the-middle-easts-military-balance

The US dished out its latest National Security Strategy in November 2025, in which it was clearly stipulated that the US would not allow any adversarial power to exercise control over oil and gas resources of the Middle East and the waterways that pass through. The US therefore came to this region for war with a strategic objective of remaining here; timings and modus operandi, however, suited Israel more. The US has assured security to the Gulf partners for years against Iran, and this war has actually dawned on them the insufficiency of US capability and capacity. They are therefore looking towards diversified means. First, KSA entered into SMDA with Pakistan, then Kuwait endorsed its defence agreement with Pakistan, followed by a multinational maritime defence alliance led by KSA and then a tri-lateral defence agreement between KSA, Türkiye and Pakistan. There are speculations that some other countries are also aspiring to be part of this agreement. Iran has been encouraging regional countries to join hands and look after regional matters themselves. Its ideology and ambitions seem to be prevailing. The space for the US to stay put in the region is thus constricting.South Asians & Diaspora

4.8-magnitude earthquake jolts Zhob, Chaman in Balochistan
China and Russia must be happy with what all the US has done in Iran, not because of the devastation but, of course, for the infamy it has brought to its stature as a Super Power. It has not been able to achieve any of its objectives and is now adamant on having an agreement with Iran concluded so that it may disengage at the earliest. During the forty-day war between the US, Israel and Iran, the oil prices did not rise to the level forecasted. It was mainly because China controlled its energy import bill. Apart from savings, it might not have desired the US to hasten its disengagement under mounting international pressure. On the contrary, China has acted maturely during the whole saga and has emerged as a very responsible actor who can be a trusted partner in future. For China, it is also comforting that the US military deployments in the Pacific were thinned out. The news of the depleting stock of missiles with the US must have pleased China further, which may consider aggressive actions against Taiwan, a glimpse of which was witnessed when, in anticipation of Typhoon Dolphin, China issued cautionary messages to the seafarers in the Taiwan Strait, obviously incurring objection from Taiwan. Russia, on the other hand, must be equally pleased with the current US imbroglio, notwithstanding the increased number and magnitude of attacks from Ukraine. President Trump’s decline of President Zelensky’s request for more Patriot missiles must be a matter of solace for President Putin, who knows Europe without the US cannot support Ukraine to the sheer disadvantage of Russia. Both China and Russia may not mind enjoying this historic opportunity the US has offered to them for some more time.

Heavy rain triggers flood alert in Rawalpindi, Islamabad as Nullah Lai rises
On the Arabian Peninsula, KSA has acted patiently, gaining substantial respect among the regional countries. It did not enter the war despite multiple attacks from Iran, until the Houthis engaged it. A clear divide between KSA and the UAE was vivid in spite of the fact that KSA condemned Iranian attacks on the UAE. This political ascendancy enabled KSA to form multiple coalitions and alliances, rallying countries under its banner. The UAE, on the other hand, was seen inclined towards Israel, India and the US, a manifestation of I2U2 formed in the year 2021. It is eyeing a pronounced post-war role or perhaps the realisation of shifting the locus of power on the Arabian Peninsula from KSA to the UAE, being attempted for the past few years. The rest of the Arab states need to survive this episode, and survival doesn’t only mean territorial integrity but geo-economic value, in fact. Israel is the only country wishing the war to continue, hoping for a multitude of benefits; Iran’s military capability is being eroded, the probability of Arab neighbours entering the war directly is increasing, and the embarrassment is being faced by the US, not Israel. Domestically also, it is serving the purpose of Benjamin Netanyahu, who has elections and judicial trials in the offing as soon as the war stops. He obviously doesn’t wish to face both.

President Zardari confers Nishan-e-Imtiaz on NSC Commander Gen Raza
India, like the UAE and Israel, is waiting for war booty in the shape of a pronounced role for I2U2. It is logical for India to curse the preeminence Pakistan has achieved. India, despite all sorts of investment in the Middle East, Europe and the US, has diminished appearance on the geo-political canvas today. If India does not get a conspicuous role in the Middle East after the conflict is over, it will be more like a customer for energy resources only. Politically, it will have to work harder to attain its pre-war position. Also, there is no room left for India to malign Pakistan, as the whole world is praising the latter and acknowledging its role as a lead mediator.South Asians & Diaspora

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Pakistan has achieved much. In spite of the fact that it isn’t a party to the conflict, it has direct stakes in it. Being a neighbour to Iran, having dependence on seaborne trade, sealing a defence agreement with KSA, enjoying closeness with the US, etc., made it mandatory for Pakistan to offer services for conflict resolution. It should now visualise a situation where it may present a case to the international community for resolving perennial issues like cross-border terrorism, abeyance of the Indus Water Treaty and the pending Kashmir dispute, expecting them to reciprocate Pakistan’s services for saving the world from a bigger catastrophe.

SOURCE:https://www.nation.com.pk/11-Aug-2026/ramifications-us-iran-conflict

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz underscores the need for US strategists to reframe what it means to exercise sea power.
“The Iranian Navy rests at the bottom of the Persian Gulf. Combat ineffective. Decimated. Destroyed. Defeated…It is no more.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made this observation less than a week after the initial US-Israeli military strikes against Iran. And yet, despite a devastating bombing campaign that substantially degraded—or even entirely destroyed—Iran’s traditional navy, Tehran continues to obstruct the safe passage of tankers, container ships, and even the US Navy through the Strait of Hormuz.

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Iran’s ability to block the strait speaks to a growing global trend. This past decade has witnessed a host of actors with few traditional instruments of maritime power confounding conventionally superior navies. Ukraine has heavily restricted the movement of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet across the western and central Black Sea. And the Houthis, a non-state actor, periodically disrupt trade through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

These cases demonstrate how relatively weaker actors can exert leverage over more powerful adversaries by exploiting inexpensive, unsophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to support near-shore operations.

This pattern defies decades of US Navy doctrine and planning.

Since the Cold War, Washington has operated on the core assumption that if the Pentagon optimizes its military capabilities to deter peer competitors, then it can readily handle lower-intensity conflicts against less capable states.

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Iran’s leverage over the strait tells a different story. Through A2/AD capabilities and geographic advantage, Iran has transformed an expected two- or three-week campaign into a five-month war. Instead, the unanticipated length of this conflict suggests that the Pentagon’s emphasis on peer or near-peer competitors has come at the expense of lower-level conflicts.

The expectation that military operations would cease relatively quickly can be partially explained by how American policymakers and military leaders have traditionally viewed sea power, a story that goes back to the late 19th century and the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Mahan brought the concept of sea power into the mainstream through his most influential work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783. In it, he described sea power as not only the demonstrated military strength of a fleet, but also the wealth generated through global trade and merchant shipping to sustain and further expand a country’s navy.

Mahan rightly understood that neither military capabilities nor economic strength alone could generate sea power. Rather, both elements were required. Importantly, however, he tied the usefulness of economic power to a state’s capacity to build and maintain a naval fleet.

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This understanding of economic strength has led contemporary strategists, academics, and military leaders to view large and expensive fleets as adequate manifestations of sea power.

For political geographer Colin Flint, “sea power is the possession and use of large and effective military and merchant fleets to achieve interests and goals.” For the US Department of Defense, “sea power describes a nation’s ability to protect its political, economic, and military interests through control of the sea .”

These visions of sea power are incomplete in today’s world.

Specifically, the economic component of sea power should be understood not only as a state’s financial capacity to generate military might but also as the ability to disrupt or damage other states’ economic capacity. Iran has effectively demonstrated this ability through its use of speed boats, drones, anti-ship missiles, and naval mines to interdict nearby shipping.

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Thus, the act of disrupting a country’s maritime trade is not an outcome of sea power, but rather a core component that defines it. This broader definition of sea power explains how smaller states—like Iran—can exercise sea power even without a large fleet or traditional sea control.

This would pose a substantial change in the traditional understanding of what platforms and systems encompass an adequate navy. A reinterpretation of sea power—to include the capacity to disrupt an adversary’s economy—would move navies away from being measured simply by fleet tonnage or the distance over which a fleet can project force to impose sea control.

While these characteristics are important in some circumstances, other capabilities, such as the capacity to disrupt trade, weaponize chokepoints, and impose economic costs, should be considered by civilian and military leaders when assessing a country’s maritime power — including one’s own.

Washington’s emphasis on high-end conflict and the relative neglect of asymmetric capabilities leaves gaps that adversaries can and have exploited. This is how Iran, a country whose navy is now “at the bottom of the Persian Gulf,” effectively countered a country with one of the world’s most technologically advanced fleets.

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As Tehran attempts to maintain de facto control of the strait and Washington looks to regain a bargaining advantage, American policymakers and military leaders should capitalize on the lessons learned in this conflict.

Broadening our understanding of sea power would be a helpful first step in preventing Washington from underestimating competitors’ military capabilities and in providing policymakers with a more realistic assessment of expected timelines and the likely costs of going to war against a seemingly weaker adversary.

About the Authors: Christopher Preble and Marie-Louise Westermann
Christopher Preble is the senior fellow and director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center, and co-host of the Net Assessment podcast. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Preble served as co-director of the Atlantic Council’s New American Engagement Initiative. He was vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute from 2011 to 2020, and director of foreign policy studies from 2003 to 2011. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Marie-Louise Westermann is a research associate for the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center. Her research examines US defense policy in the Indo-Pacific, with an emphasis on military logistics, naval strategy, and defense acquisition. Prior to joining Stimson, Westermann was a 2024 National Security Innovation Network X-Force fellow at US European Command, where she analyzed defense procurement processes within US security assistance initiatives. Westermann earned a Master of International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where she focused her studies on military and strategic affairs.

SOURCE:https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-the-us-navy-can-learn-from-iran

The Saudi Arabia-Türkiye-Pakistan defence pact is a watershed in regional security because it brings together three major Muslim states with complementary strengths and places collective defence at the centre of their relationship. Saudi Arabia brings financial resources and considerable political weight, Türkiye a formidable military and an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, and Pakistan a large professional military, strategic location and nuclear capability. At a time when the Middle East has been convulsed by wars, missile and drone attacks and growing doubts about the durability of existing security guarantees, the significance of this alignment should not be underestimated. GeographicReference

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia already have a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, signed last year, under which aggression against either country is considered aggression against both. Their military relationship is much older, stretching across decades of training, deployments and close institutional contacts. Türkiye's inclusion gives this relationship an entirely different dimension. It connects South Asia, the Gulf and a major NATO power, while bringing Turkish military technology and defence production into a relationship previously dominated by Pakistani manpower and Saudi resources.

The pact also reflects changes taking place across the region. For decades, Gulf security rested overwhelmingly on American power. That relationship is not disappearing, nor can any combination of regional states easily reproduce America's military, intelligence and logistical capabilities. But the experience of recent conflicts has persuaded regional governments that relying upon a single external guarantor carries risks. Saudi Arabia has consequently diversified its international relationships, Türkiye has pursued an increasingly autonomous foreign policy despite its NATO membership, and Pakistan has maintained close relations with China while rebuilding ties with Washington and deepening its partnerships with Riyadh and Ankara.

For Pakistan, this is an important opportunity. Islamabad has traditionally viewed national security through the prism of India, but its strategic interests extend far beyond South Asia. Millions of Pakistanis live and work in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are important economic partners, and developments in Iran and Afghanistan have immediate consequences at home. A formalised security relationship with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye increases Pakistan's diplomatic relevance at precisely the moment when regional alignments are being reconsidered.

The economic and defence-industrial opportunities may prove equally important. Türkiye has developed impressive capabilities in drones, missiles, naval platforms, electronic warfare and other technologies. Saudi Arabia has the financial resources and ambition to localise more of its enormous defence expenditure. Pakistan possesses an established defence industry, skilled manpower and relatively cost-effective production capacity. Joint ventures, technology transfers and co-production could therefore give the agreement an economic dimension that goes well beyond conventional military cooperation.

There is good reason, however, not to rush into descriptions of a “Muslim NATO”. NATO's credibility does not derive from Article 5 alone. It rests upon decades of integrated military command, common operational planning, intelligence-sharing, logistics and interoperability. The new trilateral arrangement has yet to develop such institutions. Its collective-defence commitment nevertheless has immediate deterrent value because any adversary contemplating an attack on one member must now calculate the possibility of confronting the other two. Joint exercises, intelligence coordination, military planning and cooperation on air and missile defence can gradually turn the political commitment into a credible security mechanism.

Iran presents the most delicate question for Pakistan. Islamabad cannot afford to allow this arrangement to become an anti-Iran alliance. Iran is a neighbour with which Pakistan shares a long border and significant security and economic interests, while Saudi Arabia remains one of Pakistan's closest strategic and economic partners. Pakistan has navigated this difficult balance for decades and should continue to do so. The pact should therefore be defined by what its members intend to defend rather than by identifying a permanent enemy. Indeed, a stronger Pakistan with good relations in Riyadh, Ankara and Tehran could potentially play a stabilising rather than polarising role in the region. GeographicReference

Israel will also watch this emerging alignment with considerable interest and some caution. None of the three countries has presented the pact as directed against Israel, and Saudi Arabia in particular will want to avoid that interpretation. Much will depend on how the pact evolves. If it remains essentially defensive, Israel may regard it as another feature of a changing regional order; if it develops a stronger military infrastructure or becomes entangled with the Palestinian question and future regional conflicts, Israeli concerns will inevitably grow. The three partners therefore have an interest in defining the pact carefully: as a mechanism for regional deterrence and stability rather than another axis of confrontation.

Washington is also unlikely to view greater regional burden-sharing as inherently hostile. American administrations have repeatedly urged allies to assume more responsibility for their own defence. Türkiye remains a NATO member, Saudi Arabia's military relationship with the United States remains extensive, and Pakistan has again become an important interlocutor for Washington. The more interesting development is that none of these countries now wishes to depend exclusively on one great power. Strategic autonomy does not require breaking with Washington; it means having choices.

Other Muslim-majority states may eventually find the arrangement attractive, particularly if the three founding members can demonstrate that it produces tangible security and economic benefits. Egypt, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan and Azerbaijan are obvious countries with which cooperation could expand, although each has different strategic interests and relationships. Expansion for its own sake would be a mistake. A compact arrangement that works is more valuable than an impressive list of members unable to agree on when or how collective defence should apply.

The immediate task, therefore, is to give substance to an ambitious political declaration. Saudi capital, Turkish technology and Pakistani military capability offer an unusually complementary combination. If the three governments can build joint planning mechanisms, deepen defence production, share intelligence and create credible procedures for responding to common threats, the pact could develop into the nucleus of a new regional security architecture.

CRISP: A New Strategic Platform For South, West And Central Asia
For much of the post-war period, the security architecture of the Middle East was designed elsewhere and guaranteed principally by outside powers. That era is not ending overnight, and American military power will remain indispensable for years to come. But something important has changed. Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad are signalling that regional powers can also organise, deter and defend themselves. If they can translate that proposition from paper into institutions, this agreement will be remembered not simply as another defence pact but as the moment when an important new strategic triangle began to take shape.

Source:https://thecsspoint.com/beyond-the-american-umbrella-a-new-strategic-triangle-takes-shape-by-raza-rumi/

Back in June, at the closing press conference for the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, Donald Trump explained why he had called a halt to hostilities with Iran. Continued bombing would not reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and as long as the war went on, commercial ships would stay away while emergency oil supplies dwindled.

“We run out of reserves in about four weeks,” he warned, conjuring up images of shortages, bedlam, surging prices, and a market collapse on the scale of 1929. Trump told the press that he had studied presidents, and “the one president I did not want to be was the late, great Herbert Hoover.”

Fast-forward to late July. The United States has bombed Iran for nearly two weeks, hitting coastal-surveillance sites and weapons-storage facilities as well as bridges, tunnels, rail lines, airports, and electrical infrastructure. Iran has answered with missiles and drones aimed at American bases in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar, as well as strikes on oil installations and a desalination plant, and repeated attacks on commercial shipping in and around the strait. Iran also claims to have struck Amazon’s cloud-computing infrastructure in Bahrain, but this has not been independently verified.

Trump resumed the war despite having already explained why military force could not achieve its most pressing objective. He has not resolved this tension. It may be irresoluble. In the meantime, he is betting that Tehran will buckle before economic pressure forces him to do the same.

To understand where we are, consider how the cease-fire collapsed. Each party believed that it had won the war and that the other should accede to its interpretation of the agreement on the strait. Article 5 of the memorandum of understanding stated that Iran “will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge, for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa.” The Trump administration took this to mean that Iran was obligated to open the strait without tolls for 60 days. But Tehran read it as permission to manage and control access through the waterway. Consequently, Iran sought to funnel ships through corridors it approved, and attacked or threatened vessels that used other routes.

In doing so, Tehran made a serious error in judgment. If it had laid low, it could have reaped the benefits of economic concessions for 60 days and then gradually introduced a toll. Instead, Trump felt compelled to respond, and the agreement broke down. Amos Hochstein, a senior adviser for energy and investment under President Biden, told me that Iran had thought it could boil the proverbial American frog, but it turned the temperature up too high too fast, and the frog got angry.

Trump is clearly frustrated. Further escalation is likely. He has mused about striking Pickaxe Mountain and is reportedly considering limited ground operations—for example, seizing Kharg Island, which is a hub for Iran’s oil exports. The Wall Street Journal reported that the United States is sending more forces, medics, and weaponry to the Middle East to give Trump additional military options. But such options were ruled out as implausible or reckless during the war, and their viability has not improved with time.

If Trump continues with limited strikes, he will face the very problems that he laid out in France last month. Hochstein posted on X that the current escalation in the Strait of Hormuz could be more economically dangerous than the previous one, because Russia, the U.S., and China can no longer buffer world markets as they did: Russia has reduced its diesel exports, U.S. crude and strategic reserves are unusually low, and China is cutting its oil consumption less deeply than before. In his view, markets are already signaling the inflationary risk, leaving Trump with a narrowing window to make a deal before another disruption produces a sharper fuel-price and financial shock, possibly as soon as mid- to late September.

Iran seems to want to keep the conflict at a simmer. It is striking back against the United States but has avoided direct attacks that would bring Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Israel fully into the war, even as it applies pressure indirectly, most dramatically through the Houthis’ campaign against Saudi shipping in the Red Sea. Reuters reported that Iran had previously asked the Houthis to prepare to close the Red Sea route if the United States struck Iranian power infrastructure. GeographicReference

Meanwhile, Trump seems to be actively working to keep the Gulf states on board as he continues the war. Two weeks ago, his administration significantly loosened restrictions on the export of advanced semiconductor chips to the UAE, something Abu Dhabi has been wanting for years. Then, on Wednesday, he announced that he had approved a civil nuclear-enrichment deal with Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration, in which I served, negotiated a similar arrangement with Riyadh as part of a broader deal to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. That deal, which stalled after October 7, would have provided for U.S. enrichment inside Saudi Arabia rather than giving it the ability to autonomously enrich its own uranium. The technical details of the Trump deal are unknown.

No sooner was the Saudi agreement announced than Israeli former officials and experts criticized it, on the grounds that it would fuel regional proliferation and did not require Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. On Thursday morning, Trump posted that the deal would not be approved without normalization—which was puzzling, given that the accord had been signed the day before. Hours later, Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said that if the Saudis don’t join the Abraham Accords, “the deal is off,” which likely means that the administration will not submit it to Congress for review, as is required by law.

Washington is trying to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, offer new economic and technological commitments to Gulf states, protect two maritime choke points, and fight an open-ended air war, all while the energy reserves and political patience needed to sustain those projects are running down.

Trump may inflict more pain on Iran, but this is unlikely to compel Tehran to abandon its attempt to control the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps Iran will agree to put its ambitions on hold for 60 days in the hope that the previous agreement can be revived. But if the two sides remain gridlocked, Trump will have to decide whether to pay the economic price for continuing a low-intensity war indefinitely; escalate, with all of the risks that entails; or walk away.

Source:https:https://thecsspoint.com/the-ticking-clock-on-the-strait-of-hormuz-by-thomas-wright/

The Iran war has run a live audit of the American arsenal. The example of Interwar Britain shows how little time there is to change course.
In August 1919, the British Cabinet instructed its defense departments to plan on the assumption that the empire would fight no great war for 10 years. The 10-Year Rule, renewed annually and made self-perpetuating in 1928, was a fiscal device dressed as a strategic judgment. This allowed the Treasury to balance budgets while the arsenal that had won World War I quietly dissolved. 

After Japan seized Manchuria in 1931, the rule was finally abandoned the following year. The Cabinet added a caveat: ending the rule must not be taken as justification for increased defense spending. Britain then spent seven years discovering that money appropriated late cannot buy back industrial capacity surrendered earlier. The Spitfires and radar stations that saved the country in 1940 were ready with roughly 12 months to spare.

The United States has been living under its own 10-Year Rule for three decades. The post-Cold War assumption was never written down so bluntly. Still, it governed procurement all the same: wars would be short, precision would substitute for mass, and munitions lines could idle at minimum sustaining rates because stockpiles would never be drawn down seriously. The war with Iran has now run a live audit of that assumption, and the audit has returned a failing grade.

The numbers are not classified guesses. By the time full-scale fighting paused in April, the Pentagon had expended at least half of its THAAD interceptors, nearly half of its Patriot interceptors, and roughly 30 percent of its Tomahawk inventory, according to a CSIS analysis that officials familiar with internal Defense Department estimates confirmed. Stocks of SM-3, SM-6, and JASSM each fell by roughly a fifth. With the ceasefire now collapsed and strikes resumed, expenditure is climbing again. Replenishment is where the story darkens.

Current delivery schedules provide roughly 15 new Tomahawks and 20 new Patriot interceptors per month, with no THAAD deliveries forecast in 2026. Former Pentagon comptroller Elaine McCusker estimates replenishment timelines of two to five years for most munitions. And as retired Major General John Ferrari has noted, Congress has not yet appropriated a single dollar to replace a single missile.

Interwar Britain is the closest historical analog we have to a maritime democracy in exactly this position, and the parallels deserve to be taken seriously.

First, the Treasury argued through the 1930s that economic stability was itself the “fourth arm of defence.” Britain would win a long war through superior staying power, so nothing in rearmament could be allowed to compromise the budget, the value of the pound, or the export trade. The argument was not foolish. It was the intellectual ancestor of every modern claim that industrial mobilization must wait its turn behind budget caps and continuing resolutions.

But the verdict of historian GC Peden in Arms, Economics and British Strategy on where the doctrine ended is the one that matters. By 1939, the situation had inverted, and military strategy was determining economic policy rather than the other way around. Events, not planners, decided when the doctrine expired. The Iran War is America’s inversion point. Washington has not yet noticed.

Second, when Britain finally opened the fiscal tap after 1936, money was not the problem. Industrial capacity was. Skilled labor, machine tools, and a government policy of non-interference with normal civilian trade throttled output regardless of appropriations, and the policy of protecting business as usual was not abandoned until the German Anschluss with Austria in 1938. The modern rhyme is precise. The Tomahawk line produces around 90 missiles per year, against a promised production upgrade to 1,000. Existing precision-strike missile contracts extend deliveries to 2029.

The production of interceptors depends on critical minerals such as gallium and germanium, whose supply chains run through China. Washington could quadruple the budget tomorrow. The missiles would still arrive in 2029. Money moves faster than industrial capacity, which is why the decision to build capacity cannot wait for the war that requires it.

Third, Britain planned for two decades to send a main fleet to Singapore in the event of a Japanese attack. As German and Italian naval building consumed the Royal Navy’s margin, the promised fleet shrank from adequate to symbolic. By mid-1939, the Admiralty was debating whether two capital ships might be spared. The strategic commitment outlived the overextended capability behind it.

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Today’s version is visible in plain sight. Carriers, destroyers, and interceptor inventories have been pulled from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, and the administration has accepted the risk on a stated theory: win decisively the war you are in rather than hoard capability for a war that may never come. That is a defensible theory. It is also, almost word for word, the reasoning British governments applied to Japan in the 1920s, when war in the Far East seemed remote enough to discount. The war that may never come has a habit of arriving on the schedule of the adversary who watched you spend your margin.

Which brings us to the adversary. This summer, satellite imagery revealed that China has built a full-scale, three-dimensional replica of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer at the Ruoqiang missile test range in the Taklamakan Desert, detailed down to the superstructure and radar profile of a Flight IIA or Flight III ship. It sits among earlier carrier mockups and rail-mounted moving targets, surrounded by the debris of previous missile tests.

The purpose is not mysterious. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is refining the kill chain against the exact class of warship that has spent this year launching Tomahawks into Iran. Beijing is studying American expenditure rates in real time and rehearsing against American platforms at leisure. There is no better single image of the current moment: the United States emptying its magazines in the Middle East while China builds targets shaped like the ships that carry them.

An honest version of this argument has to meet the strongest objection, because Interwar Britain supplies that too. Critics of appeasement long insisted Britain should have rearmed years earlier, but earlier rearmament would have bought obsolete equipment. The Fairey Battle bomber, ordered in bulk to hit numerical targets, was known to be unfit for purpose even as production continued. The Spitfire and the radar chain could not have been built in 1934. The modern analog writes itself: perhaps surging Tomahawk and Patriot production locks in yesterday’s munitions on the eve of a drone and hypersonic revolution, and the smarter play is to wait for the next generation.

The objection deserves a direct answer. Magazine depth is not an airframe. Interceptors, cruise missiles, and the solid rocket motors beneath them are valuable across nearly every scenario the United States can face, and the production capacity that builds them is the same capacity that will build their successors. Britain’s mistake was not building the wrong fighters in 1934. It was maintaining an industrial base so thin that even the right fighters arrived with 12 months to spare. The lesson is to buy capacity, not merely inventory.

Britain got its year of grace because Hitler moved on his timetable rather than Britain’s, and because an Expeditionary Force could be improvised while the Channel held. The United States has no English Channel in the Pacific and should not plan on the grace period. The prescriptions follow from the diagnosis. Congress must appropriate munitions replenishment now, as the first order of business, not as a rider on the next supplemental.

The Pentagon must contract for capacity, with multi-year procurement commitments that give solid rocket motor and seeker suppliers a reason to invest, the same demand stability the shipbuilding industrial base has needed for a decade. And planners must treat the Western Pacific interceptor ledger as the strategic balance sheet it is, because Beijing already does.

The 10-Year Rule was never repealed by argument. Japanese aggression repealed it, and even then the Treasury fought a seven-year rearguard action against the implications. The Iran War has now repealed America’s version. The only open question is whether Washington spends the next seven years the way London spent 1932 to 1939, arguing about affordability while the adversary built, or whether it treats a live audit as the gift it is: a warning delivered while there is still time to act on it.

About .the Author: Christopher Carroll

Christopher Carroll is a shipbuilding policy analyst for Systems Planning and Analysis; his views are his own. He holds a Master of Public Policy from the Pepperdine School of Public Policy, where his capstone research examined the reindustrialization of the American shipbuilding base. His writing has appeared in RealClearDefense, AllSides, and the publications of the American Society of Naval Engineers

Source:https://thecsspoint.com/americas-10-year-rule-just-ended-by-christopher-carroll/

Barely a week after the recovery of the final bodies from the Sorange coal mine near Quetta, Pakistan's latest mining disaster is already fading from the headlines. Yet the deaths of 34 miners should not simply become another statistic. As with previous mining disasters, expressions of grief, promises of investigations and compensation for bereaved families have followed. The real test, however, is whether this tragedy finally prompts the reforms needed to improve mining conditions in the country. 

The HRCP's 2022 fact-finding report, ‘Beneath the Surface: Rights Violations in Balochistan's Coal Mines', documented hazardous working conditions, weak labour protections and the limited livelihood options facing coal miners in the province. It pointed out how shortages of trained mine inspectors, infrequent inspections and weak enforcement of safety regulations have allowed these dangerous conditions to persist.

The HRCP's recommendations were neither radical nor prohibitively expensive. They included strengthening the Mines Inspectorate capacity and effectiveness, ensuring adequate ventilation and continuous methane monitoring, improving emergency response capacity, extending social security protections to miners, and ratifying the ILO's Convention on safety and health in mines. Till today, most of these recommendations remain only partially implemented.

The Quetta tragedy, therefore, reflects a broader governance failure. Nonetheless, the government has increasingly identified critical minerals, including rare earth elements, as strategic resources capable of attracting foreign investment and strengthening industrial development. Our decision-makers view these resources as an opportunity to position Pakistan within rapidly evolving global supply chains amid the energy transition and intensifying geopolitical competition. But the real challenge lies not in extracting more minerals, but in ensuring that their extraction is governed effectively, transparently and sustainably.

History offers numerous examples of resource-rich countries which have struggled to convert mineral wealth into broad-based development because institutions failed to keep pace with extraction. Congo's cobalt sector serves as a cautionary tale, demonstrating how weak governance can contribute to child labour, water and soil contamination, hazardous working conditions, and limited local benefits despite vast mineral wealth.

Attracting foreign investment in mining will increasingly depend not only on geological potential but also on credible institutions, predictable regulation, environmental and social safeguards, and safe working conditions, all of which reduce investment risk and help secure a project's social licence to operate. Expanding mineral extraction without first strengthening governance could thus be a costly mistake.

Although rare earth extraction involves different mining and processing techniques than underground coal mining, both industries depend on strong occupational safety systems, effective environmental regulation, transparent licensing, competent regulatory institutions and meaningful accountability. Rare earth mining can also generate significant environmental and public health risks through chemical processing, toxic waste disposal, groundwater contamination and ecosystem degradation if not carefully regulated. Countries such as Australia and Canada have demonstrated that internationally competitive mining sectors are built not only on geological potential but also on strong regulatory institutions, rigorous environmental oversight and high labour standards.

Pakistan must take a hard look at the shortcomings of its mining sector before embarking on an expansion of its extractive industries. Safety and environmental protections should not be viewed as obstacles to investment but instead as essential foundations for sustainable resource development and ensuring that mineral wealth contributes to sustainable development rather than recurring casualties, rampant labour exploitation and avoidable ecological destruction. 

Source: https://tribune.com.pk/story/2622469/quetta-mine-tragedy-a-warning-for-pakistan

Opening Saudi Arabia’s path toward uranium enrichment may put Saudi nuclear development on US terms, or it could trigger a Middle East arms race.
President Donald Trump’s approval of a 30-year civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia marks a potentially transformative moment in Middle Eastern politics. A major Saudi demand that has been in the works for years, it has the potential to act as a double-edged sword. It may strengthen Washington’s influence in Riyadh, but permitting Saudi enrichment could intensify Iran’s nuclear ambitions, alarm Israel, and weaken the barriers to nuclear proliferation across the Middle East. GeographicReference

According to reports, the agreement could eventually permit the kingdom to enrich uranium on its own territory, subject to further studies and safeguards negotiated between Washington and Riyadh. At the same time, it apparently does not require Saudi Arabia to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which would give inspectors considerably greater access to nuclear facilities and information.

The agreement has yet to complete the congressional review required under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Its final provisions may therefore change. However, it is highly unlikely that Congress will be able to derail or alter the agreement given the onerous process of overriding a presidential veto. The outlines of the agreement already reported raise a fundamental question: Can the United States help Saudi Arabia develop nuclear energy without contributing to a regional competition for nuclear latency—the capacity to produce nuclear weapons relatively quickly without actually possessing them?

The strongest argument for the agreement is that Saudi Arabia intends to build a nuclear-energy program regardless of whether Washington participates in it. The kingdom wants to diversify its energy mix, conserve more oil and natural gas for export, and develop the technological foundations of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 modernization program. Saudi Arabia has discussed nuclear cooperation with China, Russia, France, and South Korea, and the United States cannot prevent it from purchasing reactors and technical assistance elsewhere indefinitely.
An American agreement would therefore allow Washington to shape a program that might otherwise develop under much weaker controls. US-supplied nuclear material and equipment would be subject to legally binding peaceful-use commitments, accounting requirements, physical-security standards, and inspection arrangements. American companies would also gain access to a commercially valuable market while Washington strengthened its strategic relationship with the most influential Arab state and potential counterweight to Iran. From this perspective, the agreement can be perceived as an attempt to keep the kingdom’s nuclear development within an American-led regulatory framework. History

A Saudi civilian program could also provide Washington with additional leverage over Riyadh. Reactor construction, fuel supply, maintenance, personnel training, and waste management create relationships lasting several decades. Dependence on American technology could also make Saudi Arabia more responsive to US concerns. These are substantial advantages. However, they do not resolve the central problem posed by uranium enrichment.

Civilian reactors do not require a country to enrich its own uranium. Fuel can be purchased from international suppliers, just as the United Arab Emirates does under its nuclear agreement with the United States. The UAE accepted what became known as the “gold standard”: a legally binding renunciation of domestic enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to accept the same restrictions suggests that its objectives extend beyond simply generating power for civilian use.

Enrichment is a dual-use technology. The same centrifuges that produce low-enriched uranium for reactors can, if reconfigured and operated for longer periods, produce highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons. A state possessing enrichment plants, trained specialists, uranium stocks, and advanced centrifuges can remain formally within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while substantially shortening the time needed to manufacture weapons.

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This concern is magnified by Mohammed bin Salman’s repeated declaration that Saudi Arabia would acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran did so. His statement was intended to deter Tehran, but it also confirmed that Riyadh views its nuclear choices through a strategic rather than purely commercial lens. The distinction between a civilian program and a weapons option could therefore become increasingly blurred. GeographicReference

The reported absence of a Saudi commitment to the IAEA Additional Protocol is equally troubling. Standard safeguards are principally designed to monitor declared nuclear material and facilities. The Additional Protocol gives inspectors broader authority to investigate undeclared activities, obtain environmental samples, and gain access to associated research and manufacturing sites. Permitting domestic enrichment without requiring this more intrusive inspection system would combine a sensitive technology with insufficient transparency.

The agreement’s most immediate geopolitical impact will be felt in Iran. Tehran is almost certain to cite the Saudi arrangement as evidence of American double standards. Washington has demanded that Iran surrender or sharply curtail its enrichment activities while apparently accepting that Saudi Arabia might eventually operate an enrichment facility. Iranian leaders will argue that the United States objects not to enrichment itself but to enrichment only by adversaries.

This argument will resonate domestically in Iran. Iranian politicians who favor accommodation with the West will find it difficult to defend permanent restrictions if Washington accords a regional rival more permissive treatment. It will strengthen Tehran’s argument that any future nuclear agreement recognize an unrestricted Iranian right to enrich uranium on its own soil. The Saudi agreement may consequently undermine American bargaining power in future negotiations with Iran.

At the same time, the deal could exert useful pressure on Tehran. Iranian leaders have long assumed that their technological advantages give them a privileged position in the Gulf region. The prospect of Saudi Arabia acquiring an internationally supported nuclear infrastructure might demonstrate that continued Iranian nuclear advances will generate countervailing capabilities among its neighbors.

Israel’s reaction is likely to be ambivalent. Israeli leaders welcome closer US-Saudi strategic cooperation and regard Saudi Arabia as an important potential partner in containing Iran. A nuclear agreement could deepen Riyadh’s dependence on Washington and perhaps support broader Saudi-Israeli normalization in the future. However, this is unlikely to happen in the absence of a clear path toward Israel’s acceptance of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. President Trump’s announcement on Thursday that the nuclear deal is contingent on Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of the Abraham Accords may cast doubt on the deal.

More importantly, Israel has historically opposed the emergence of advanced nuclear capabilities in neighboring states. Its doctrine of maintaining its position as the sole nuclear weapons power in the Middle East led to attacks on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s suspected reactor at al-Kibar in 2007. Saudi Arabia is not currently an enemy, but governments and alignments change. Israeli strategists must consider what Saudi enrichment facilities might mean 10, 20, or 30 years from now. They may conclude that its negative implications outweigh its positive ones.

The broader consequences of proliferation could also be profound. Turkey and Egypt are unlikely to accept permanently a regional order in which Iran possesses an advanced enrichment program, Israel maintains an all but acknowledged nuclear arsenal, and Saudi Arabia enjoys an American-approved enrichment capability. Both possess substantial scientific institutions and aspirations to regional leadership. The Saudi precedent could encourage them to seek similar rights to develop and maintain a nuclear program, including the right to nuclear enrichment on their territories. GeographicReference

The result would not necessarily be an immediate cascade of nuclear weapons. A more probable outcome is the proliferation of threshold capabilities: several states developing the technology, materials, and expertise needed to produce weapons relatively quickly. Such an arrangement might appear stable because no government openly crosses the nuclear threshold. In reality, it would make the region more vulnerable to crises, miscalculation, preventive war, and rapid arms races.

The decisive issue, therefore, is not whether Saudi Arabia should possess nuclear power for civilian uses. It is whether Washington should help create another nuclear-threshold state in the world’s most volatile region. Unless the agreement draws a firm and verifiable boundary between civilian energy and weapons capability, it may end up planting the seeds of a much more dangerous nuclear order in the Middle East.

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/donald-trumps-saudi-nuclear-gamble

On 5 August 2019, India revoked Article 370 of its Constitution, abolished Kashmir’s special status, and unilaterally declared Kashmir to be an integral part of India. The question, however, is whether this made Kashmir a part of India. Do the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the principles enshrined in the UN Charter cease to exist because of sham legislation passed by India?

A few fundamental points must be clearly understood.

Kashmir is a disputed territory. Under international law, its final status remains to be determined. The United Nations has made it unequivocally clear that this determination can only be made through a plebiscite conducted under UN supervision. Neither the local puppet assembly in Kashmir has the authority to decide the matter outside the framework of the UN-mandated plebiscite, nor does India possess such authority. No decision by either, whether constitutional or administrative, can substitute the right of self-determination. Nor do they have any legal authority to determine the future of Kashmir.

India cannot deprive the people of Kashmir of their right to self-determination on the basis of any amendment to its Constitution.

Likewise, India cannot deprive the people of Kashmir of their right to self-determination on the basis of any amendment to its Constitution. India is an occupying power, and the United Nations has never recognised this occupation. India’s Constitution may apply within India, but it does not apply to Kashmir because Kashmir is not a part of India. International law is explicit that an occupying power does not acquire sovereignty over occupied territory. Regardless of how long the occupation continues, it remains nothing more than an occupying power.

This principle was established in the 1928 Pact of Paris. It is also reflected in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. Article 45 of the Hague Convention reiterates the same principle, and it has been reaffirmed in numerous resolutions of both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council: an occupying power does not become the sovereign of occupied territory.

Another important point is that, in international disputes, India’s Constitution has no standing before international law. International disputes are not resolved under the Constitution of the occupying state; they are resolved in accordance with international law and the established principles of the United Nations. As a member of the international community, India is bound by UN resolutions. The United Nations is not bound by India’s Constitution.

It should also be remembered that Article 370 is not our point of reference. Whether it exists or is abolished is of no consequence to us. It was merely an arrangement between India and its protégé, Sheikh Abdullah. Our point of reference is the UN resolutions and the plebiscite.

The United Nations Security Council settled this principle sixty-eight years ago, on 30 March 1951, and again in November 1956. It declared that no law or decision passed by the Indian Parliament or the Assembly of occupied Kashmir regarding the future of Kashmir would have any legal effect, nor could it extinguish the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination.

If Kashmir was an unresolved international dispute under international law, it was not because of Article 370. The abrogation of that Article does not alter Kashmir’s legal status.

Kashmir’s status is determined by United Nations resolutions. Regarding these resolutions, the Security Council decided in 1996 that they would remain on its agenda unless both Pakistan and India agreed otherwise. An issue that remains governed by UN resolutions and continues to be on the Security Council’s agenda cannot be extinguished through an amendment to the Indian Constitution. 

Source: https://dailytimes.com.pk/1533574/kashmir-what-does-international-law-say/

EVERY few years, Pakistan revisits the debate on creating new provinces. The interior minister’s recent proposal to establish smaller administrative units has again raised an important question. Yet the real issue is not how many provinces Pa­­kistan should have. It is whether government is close enough to serve its citizens effectively. Adm­inistrative boundaries matter only because they influence how quickly people receive education, healthcare, justice, infrastructure and disaster relief. If governance remains distant and unresponsive, merely redrawing maps won’t improve lives.

With over 240 million people spread across nearly 796,000 square kilometres, Pakistan is one of the world’s largest federations. Its administrative challenges vary enormously — from the mountains of Gilgit-Baltistan to the deserts of Thar and the vast expanse of Balochistan. A governance model suited to Lahore or Karachi cannot automatically meet the needs of Kech, Upper Kohistan or Astore. The real challenge is one of state capacity rather than geography alone.

Pakistan’s history reflects repeated efforts to balance national unity with effective administration. At independence in 1947, West Pakistan comprised Punjab, Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province, the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Balochistan, princely states — including Kalat, Bahawalpur and Swat — and the Tribal Areas. The 1955 One Unit scheme attempted to centralise administration; instead, it deepened regional grievances. Its abolition in 1970 and the federal framework established by the 1973 Constitution reaffirmed the importance of provincial autonomy. More recently, the merger of Fata into KP demonstrated that Pakistan’s administrative structure can evolve when necessary. Yet demands for South Punjab, Hazara and Bahawalpur continue because many citizens still feel distant from provincial capitals.

The case for smaller administrative units is fundamentally administrative rather than political. Punjab’s population exceeds that of many countries, while Balochistan covers almost 44 per cent of Pakistan’s territory but contains only a small share of its population. Administering such contrasting regions through similar institutional arrangements limits efficiency.

Have power, resources and decision-making been devolved enough to serve citizens effectively?

Governments perform best when decision-makers are close to the communities they serve. Greater administrative proximity improves supervision of schools, hospitals, roads and development projects while strengthening transparency and public accountability. The devastating floods of 2022 illustrated the value of capable local institutions. Where local administrative capacity was stronger, relief reached affected communities more quickly.

At the same time, creating new provinces is neither simple nor inexpensive. Constitutional ame­n­­dments require broad political consensus, while new provinces need legislatures, secretariats, ju­­d­­icial institutions and sustainable financial res­o­u­­rces. Without careful planning, administrative re­­organisation risks creating additional bureaucracy without significantly improving governance.

International experience offers useful lessons. India has repeatedly created new states — including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Telangana — to improve governance in historically neglected regions. Although disputes over assets and water accompanied these reforms, smaller states enabled governments to focus more closely on local priorities. Bangladesh adopted a different approach.

Rather than creating provinces, it strengthened districts, upazilas and union parishads. Improvements in rural healthcare, primary education and disaster management owe much to effective local administration. Indonesia embarked on one of the world’s largest decentralisation programmes after reforms in 1998, transferring substantial authority and financial resources to districts and municipalities. Nigeria, by contrast, demonstrates the risks of expanding administrative units without fiscal sustainability; while political representation improved, the country developed an expensive state structure heavily dependent on federal revenues. France provides yet another model, devolving significant powers to departments and municipalities without repeatedly altering regional boundaries.

Despite their different political systems, these countries illustrate one common principle: successful administrative reform depends less on the number of administrative units than on whether authority, financial resources and accountability actually reach local institutions.

Ironically, Pakistan already possesses the constitutional foundation for this approach. Article 140A requires provinces to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility to them. Yet successive governments have implemented this provision unevenly. Pakistan’s own experience supports stronger LG. The 2001 Local Government Plan transferred significant responsibilities for education, healthcare and local development to elected district governments. Although politically controversial, it demonstrated the benefits of bringing decision-making closer to citizens. After the 18th Amendment, provinces gained substantial autonomy from Islamabad, but meaningful decentralisation often stopped at the provincial level. Many districts and municipalities remained dependent on provincial governments for authority and funding. Thus, the debate over new provinces and LG should be seen as complementary rather than competing.

Where there is broad public consensus, administrative necessity and economic viability, new provinces should remain a legitimate constitutional option. But such reforms must be guided by transparent criteria and accompanied by agreed arrangements for finance, water, civil services and transitional administration. At the same time, meaningful LG reform should begin immediately. Provinces should guarantee predictable financial transfers to elected LGs, devolve responsibility for primary education, basic healthcare, water supply, sanitation and local infrastructure, conduct regular local elections, and protect local institutions from arbitrary dissolution. Devolution without financial autonomy cannot succeed.

For nearly eight decades, Pakistan has alternated between centralisation and decentralisation, often expecting structural changes alone to resolve governance failures. Experience at home and abroad suggests otherwise. Institutions matter more than boundaries. The purpose of administrative reform is not to redraw maps but to improve lives. When a child in Rajanpur, Tharpar­kar, Upper Kohistan, Kech, Astore or Neelum Valley enjoys the same access to education and healthcare as one in Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta or Islamabad; when a mother in Dera Bugti can obtain timely medical care; and when citizens across Punjab, Sindh, KP, Balochistan, GB and Azad Kashmir experience responsive public institutions, Pakistan will know that administrative reform has achieved its purpose.

A federation’s true strength is measured not by the number of provinces on its map, but by the confidence of its citizens that their government is never too distant to serve them.

The writer is a retired inspector general of police and former DG FIA.

Published in Dawn, August 5th, 2026

Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/2020707/rethinking-governance-in-pakistan