Express Tribune Editorials 15th March 2025

[danish]

Enter ZAB Jr
PPP has ruled Sindh undisputed for much of Pakistan’s existence. In both pre- and post-Zia periods, it was, and has been, nothing but the PPP show, save for a single term (2002-2007) during the Musharraf period when a pro-establishment coalition of MQM, PML-Q, PML-F and National Alliance governed Sindh, denying PPP – the majority party with 51 out of a total of 130 general seats – its principled right to form the government in the province.

All these years, no political entity has managed to pose any challenge to the PPP vote bank in Sindh despite the fact that party’s rule remains embroiled in allegations of inaction and corruption.


Even PPP-Shaheed Bhutto group – formed by none other than Mir Murtaza Bhutto, the younger son of PPP founder Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – failed to make a mark and to dent the PPP popularity. The party rather failed miserably in its first test at the ballot in 1993, only managing a single seat, in Sindh Assembly, clinched by party leader Murtaza who had contested on nearly half a dozen seats.

After Murtaza’s murder in 1996, the party whose leaders proclaimed themselves to be “real Bhuttos” gradually zoomed out of politics.

However now, the only son of Murtaza Bhutto, who had left Pakistan to settle abroad, has declared entering politics. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Junior has, in his first salvos at the PPP, toed what is a popular line in the prevailing political climate in Sindh that is marked by protests and rallies against the decision of the federal government – of which PPP is also a part – to carve out new canals from the Indus river system.

Even though the PPP has got a resolution passed from Sindh Assembly, it finds itself in a difficult position, as indulging in some serious opposition to the canal initiative and playing to the gallery would land it on the wrong side of the reigning political divide.

Sweet profiteering
The recent turmoil in the sugar market, characterised by soaring prices and a growing sense of discontent among consumers, has cast a stark light on the government's sugar export policy. A few months back, the government played up its decision to allow sugar exports as a means to stabilise the domestic market by increasing production and stimulating economic growth. However, subsequent domestic price increases and the need to import sugar to stabilise prices have exposed the shortsightedness of this approach.


The export policy not only led to a depletion of local stocks but also ignited a price hike that has seen sugar prices surge from Rs159 per kg to Rs170, with experts cautioning that they could soon reach Rs200. This disruption has made life increasingly difficult for most consumers, who are already struggling to pay for other essential commodities as inflation — though much lower than in the last few years - continues to outpace income growth.

The government's earlier justification for exporting sugar was price stabilisation — avoiding a large price dip that might discourage growers. However, the people pushing for exports were not growers, but millers, who are more concerned with increasing their profits rather than stablising domestic prices and supply. Unfortunately, Musadik Malik, one of the only prominent voices to oppose exports, was removed from the Sugar Export Monitoring Committee for his trouble.

There is no excuse for letting supplies run so low that last-minute imports are necessitated. Commercial sugar has a very long shelf life and can easily be stocked well in advance to ensure price stability for domestic consumers while also leaving some stock available for export if international prices rise significantly. This, or any similar approach, would be in the best interests of all parties except profiteers. Unfortunately, agriculture policy has always been less about the people and more about the interests of large landholders and mill owners, many of whom double as parliamentarians and profiteers.
Solar puzzle
There is a policy dichotomy at work in the energy realm solely meant to discourage solar power consumers. The jugglery of math suggests that the government will now buy back electricity for Rs10 per unit from new net-metering consumers, a slash of Rs17 from the previous tariff, whereas those purchasing power from the grid will continue to pay from Rs42 to Rs65 per unit, excluding taxes and duties.


The new net metering policy has met with a difference of opinion among the cabinet stalwarts themselves, as many disapprove of it as a bad signal to the market, as well as those on off-grid solarisation and agricultural tube-wells. A simple one-liner explanation for this change of heart is that there is a significant increase in the number of solar net-metering consumers, resulting in strain on national exchequer.

The new framework has also scrapped net billing, and the existing consumers will gradually come under this dictum as their seven-year contracts expire. Moreover, consumers will no longer be allowed to install solar capacity exceeding their sanctioned load, except for a 10 per cent cushion; and imported and exported units shall be treated separately, apart from denying consumers the privilege to encash credited units.

The decision has come close on the heels of a measure to reduce circular debt by obtaining a loan of Rs1.25 trillion from the commercial banks, in an earnest attempt to appease IPPs with outstanding payments, and to stay afloat on a lower interest rate for ensuring timely payments for new energy purchases. Thus, the new calculation in the solar sector will save the government a staggering Rs545 billion by the year 2034, as the cost of net-metering will escalate to Rs3.6 per unit.

This decorum is not only puzzling but highly unrealistic, and will result in lower investments in future on solar panels. It also defeats an earlier policy of mushrooming renewable power generation avenues. Perhaps, the intention is to compel consumers to stay on the expensive grid, which sells electricity at an exorbitant, scuttling growth and exports.