At an Impasse
The latest exchange of fire between Washington and Tehran has revived the risk of a wider confrontation just as senior US military leaders warn that prolonged operations at the present scale are unsustainable. However, contrary to controversy-peddlers, the question confronting Washington is still nowhere near whether it can hurt Iran. It can. The harder question is what all that pressure is supposed to buy.
The economic results are stark. Iranian crude and condensate loadings fell to roughly 220,000 barrels a day in August, from about two million barrels a day in March. For about seven weeks, Iran has managed no meaningful crude exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet Tehran has not capitulated. Instead, the contest has moved into the waterway through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil normally passes.
That is where the cost of an open-ended campaign becomes harder to contain. Two supertankers carrying Saudi crude were struck by unidentified projectiles while leaving the strait on Monday. Kpler counted only five visible commodity vessels transiting Hormuz that day, against a 10-day average of about 14. Brent crude traded above $92 on Tuesday, speaking volumes about how economic strangulation can produce consequences far beyond Iran.Stream History Documentaries
The strain is visibly showing on the American side as well. More than 50,000 US personnel have been kept on alert in the region and barely a quarter of the Navy’s destroyer fleet is ready to deploy. Patriot and THAAD interceptor stocks have been depleted, Reaper losses have mounted, and some deployments are scheduled to extend into 2027. That leaves Washington with a question it cannot evade forever: how much military readiness should be consumed in a campaign with no settled end date?
This is precisely why the diplomatic opening now being pushed by Pakistan and Qatar deserves attention. President Masoud Pezeshkian has taken the right path by signalling that Iran would reciprocate if Washington returned to its commitments under the Islamabad memorandum. Building momentum, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar has once again called its sincere implementation the only way forward. Since the document already exists and both sides have signed it, there appears to be no need to reinvent the wheel.
Even if Washington has accumulated leverage, Tehran has already shown that it can make that leverage expensive for its neighbours and the international market. The sensible use of pressure now is to convert it into terms. That would not be a retreat for either side. Rather, it would be the purpose for which such leverage was accumulated. Another round of strikes may destroy more targets. It will not resolve the question increasingly hanging over the campaign: where does this war end? *
‘Shared Geography’
India reached Bishkek, speaking of turning “shared geography into shared opportunities.” Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif used the same stage to remind the region how this geography also creates obligations. Water, he said, is the lifeblood of South Asia and cannot be used for coercion or political leverage. The timing was particularly awkward for New Delhi as just a day earlier, the arbitral tribunal in The Hague had held that the Indus Waters Treaty remains in force and that India had no lawful basis to place it in abeyance.
That ruling strengthens a position Pakistan has maintained since April 2025. India suspended participation in the treaty framework after the Pahalgam attack and sought to inject a security dispute into the management of a river system, on which roughly 80 per cent of Pakistan’s agriculture depends. While there’s no denying New Delhi’s right to pursue the perpetrators, no law could grant it a leeway to rewrite an international treaty by executive fiat.
The treaty’s history makes India’s course harder to defend. It survived the wars of 1965 and 1971, military stand-offs and years when bilateral dialogue was barely alive. Even as previous Indian governments understood that the Indus could not be made hostage to every rupture in political relations, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has chosen otherwise.Send Money Overseas
India rejected the tribunal’s jurisdiction, while technical questions over the Ratle project remain before a World Bank-appointed neutral expert. Its objection cannot erase the finding that the treaty continues to bind both states.
PM Modi’s sermon on terrorism deserves equally close scrutiny. He demanded the dismantling of terrorist financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, attacked “double standards.” Those principles are unobjectionable, yet India’s own recent record abroad makes the moralising considerably harder to swallow.
In the US, Nikhil Gupta pleaded guilty this year to taking part in a murder-for-hire plot (at the behest of an Indian government official) targeting a Sikh separatist and US citizen in New York. In Canada, an official foreign-interference inquiry recorded findings that the Indian government had worked with criminal networks involved in violent activity against members of the South Asian community. Therefore, a government facing such serious allegations of transnational repression should be particularly careful when lecturing an entire region on state-sponsored violence.
Bishkek exposed another contradiction. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation speaks of connectivity, energy cooperation and predictable regional commerce, areas in which PM Modi has spent years courting Central Asian partners. India cannot advertise dependable connectivity across Eurasia while making a six-decade water compact politically conditional in South Asia. Pakistan has chosen the stronger course of treaty mechanisms, arbitration, technical engagement and international law. Its SCO chairmanship now provides room to press for serious regional cooperation on water security, glacier monitoring, flood warning and hydrological data. The IWT was designed to survive precisely the hostility India is now trying to insert into it. Pakistan has every right to insist that a river shared by two neighbours remain governed by law, not by New Delhi’s political temper. *