Yemen flare-up
INTENSE fighting has broken out between the Saudi-backed government of Yemen, and the pro-Iran Houthi Ansarallah group that currently holds the capital Sanaa and much of the north.
While the hostilities will add to the miseries of the Yemeni people, the conflict is tied to the US-Iran war as well. Questions have also been raised about the involvement of Saudi Arabia’s allies, including Pakistan, as the Houthis have struck positions in the kingdom. The Yemeni front was largely quiet since the 2022 Saudi-Houthi ceasefire took effect.
But over the past few weeks, there has been open war between the government and Ansarallah. In fact, the Houthis have captured the strategically important city of Mocha as well as key islands off the coast, leaving them largely in control of who gets to pass through the Bab al-Mandeb strait. The Houthis say maritime passage is open to all except Saudi vessels.
As the Yemeni front heats up, it is welcome that Pakistan has taken a measured approach to the conflict, in light of its recently upgraded defence ties with Saudi Arabia. In a statement, the Foreign Office said that while Pakistan offered “unwavering support” for Saudi Arabia, there were no plans to join the kingdom in striking the Houthis. The FO further added that Pakistan was “desirous of peace and stability in Yemen”.
This is a balanced stance on what is geopolitically a very tricky issue. While Pakistan has indeed signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, it would be a risky endeavour to join offensive action against forces in a third country. Instead, Pakistan should push for an immediate ceasefire and a diplomatic solution to the Yemeni conflict.
While Iran has influence over the Houthis, the Yemeni armed group makes its own decisions. However, Islamabad can use its diplomatic channels with Tehran to ask the latter to convince the Houthis to pursue a diplomatic solution. The Yemeni group should halt its attacks on Saudi Arabia; the kingdom, too, should refrain from targeting Yemen. Moreover, Ansarallah has demanded an end to the blockade of Yemen. If Riyadh were to agree to this, it would send a positive message to the pro-Iran group, and could help restart talks for a long-term peace.
The fact is that if there is to be a sustainable solution to the Yemeni conflict, then a power-sharing agreement including all of Yemen’s tribes and sects is needed. If the conflict escalates, Bab al-Mandeb could face a blockade just as the Strait of Hormuz does. This would spell more trouble for the global economy. Therefore, Pakistan and regional states need to push for a ceasefire and peace talks involving the Houthis, the Saudis and the Yemeni government.
Published in Dawn, September 12th, 2026
An opening
THERE is movement, at last. The Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, Mehmood Khan Achakzai, on Friday acknowledged that consultations have begun between his office and the prime minister’s to set a meeting date for discussions on the appointment of the next chief election commissioner. It was reported a day earlier that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had reached out to the opposition leader for the mandatory consultation, stalled inordinately by the political deadlock between the government and the opposition. A month ago, the opposition leader had urged the government to replace the CEC and the two members of the Election Commission representing Sindh and Balochistan, whose terms expired in January 2025 — some 20 months ago. The three stayed on because of a proviso in the 26th Amendment, which had been passed merely three months before they were due to depart. The CEC has been the subject of sustained criticism since the February 2024 general election, with the ECP’s decisions in the lead-up to, during and after that election blamed for the severe political and legal crises that followed.
Now is as good a time as any to move on from that period and make a fresh start. Change must begin with restoring some credibility to the ECP, and that depends in large part on the appointment of a new chief who is acceptable to both the government and the opposition, and then giving the commission the space it needs to act fairly and in consonance with the requirements laid down in the Constitution. It is hoped that the government is not merely using the appointment as a de-escalation measure, considering that the invitation was extended only days before the PTI’s planned long march on Islamabad this month. The opposition leader is a stalwart of Pakistani politics and widely seen as a reasonable interlocutor. The government should have engaged him in the process much earlier. Now that it has, it must complete the process in good faith. Consultation is only the first step: three names must still clear a parliamentary committee — failure to agree would leave each side submitting rival lists. Together, the prime minister and the opposition leader can arrive at a name that can be trusted to remain independent and withstand pressures from any quarter. The sooner this matter is concluded, the better.
Published in Dawn, September 12th, 2026
Flawed NEV incentive
THE draft New Energy Vehicle policy gets its destination right. Electrifying transport, cutting the oil import bill and building an export-oriented auto industry are worthwhile goals. But the incentive structure chosen to achieve them rewards the wrong technology. The main flaw is treating plug-in hybrid and battery electric vehicles as interchangeable. Both qualify for the same 1pc sales tax on CKD units and NEV inputs — as if a PHEV running mostly on petrol delivers the same environmental pay-off as a BEV. It does not. Pretending otherwise weakens the policy’s stated purpose. Weak charging infrastructure and real range anxiety discourage Pakistani consumers from buying BEVs. Subsidising PHEVs just as heavily hands them an easier option, which will show up as progress on paper while doing little to build the charging network or battery-vehicle demand the transition actually needs.
PHEV assemblers received generous concessions under the last auto policy but never delivered localisation or built charging infrastructure. Repeating that arrangement will invite the same outcome: subsidised assembly with no real technology transfer. Taxing conventional hybrids at 25pc, up from 8.5pc, while cutting PHEV tax to 1pc, amounts to picking a winner through the tax code rather than market competition. That stalls transition towards genuine transport electrification while penalising Japanese manufacturers who built much of Pakistan’s auto parts ecosystem. A more coherent policy would reserve the sharpest incentives for BEVs, and let others compete on their actual emissions and fuel-savings performance. Consumers, not tax brackets, should decide which of these technologies wins as charging infrastructure improves and prices come down. The rest of the draft holds up. Export targets, tighter localisation rules and incentives tied to auto-parts exports could finally push manufacturers to build for international markets, instead of just assembling for domestic buyers. But those incentives need to reward genuine export growth and local value addition, not simply subsidise the same low-localisation assembly model that has defined the industry for decades.
Published in Dawn, September 12th, 2026